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A growing number of studies indicate that increased incorporation of national regulatory 
agencies into the multi-level administrative structures of EU transforms existing patterns of 
administrative behavior in these institutions. In particular, the traditional, more local patterns 
of behavior seem to be supplemented and/or replaced by the supranational behavioral logics. 
 
This study uses a case of the Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority (RME) to examine if 
RME’s embeddedness into the EU policy networks affects administrative decision-making 
within this regulatory agency. By examining role perceptions of RME officials, conceptualized 
by three role orientations - departmental, professional, and/or supranational, this study tried to 
understand European integration through the transformative processes happening at the level 
of individual-decision makers.  
 
The empirical findings suggest that administrative behavior of RME officials are located on the 
functional expert - bureaucrat dimension, and that it is systematically shaped by the 
organizational structure. In particular, the horizontal specialization of the RME agency along 
functional lines wields the strongest effect on the formation of the departmental role among 
RME officials. Concomitantly, the inter-organizational vertical specialization whereby the 
RME is structurally separated from the Ministry wields the strongest effect on the formation of 
the professional/expert role among RME officials. These patterns of behavior epitomize the 
traditional split between politics and profession and seem to be quite stable and resilient to 
change.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
National regulatory authorities (NRAs) play a crucial role in the daily operation of the European 
Union’s system of network governance by providing expertise in policy development and 
implementation, by linking member state governments and administrations with the EU level 
and by increasing the acceptance of European laws and programs at the national level (Egeberg 
2006). Together with the EU agencies, NRAs introduce innovative regulatory arrangements 
into the EU network governance due to their significant impact on regulatory outcomes. Stuffed 
by knowledge-based experts, such agencies are well positioned to ‘make a difference by 
providing technical, scientific and managerial expertise that can underpin new legal initiatives 
as well as help to implement and monitor existing legislation’ (Jevnaker and Saerbeck 2018:61) 
to guarantee homogenous application of EU legislation.  
 
Following ratification of the EU’s Third Energy Market Package into the Norwegian law, a 
single regulatory authority was created in Norway to handle harmonization of electricity and 
gas market regulations between EU and Norway. The Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority 
(RME)1 was designated in November 2019 to become part of the European network of energy 
regulators coordinated by EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The 
creation of RME created a lot of public debate in Norway - a country with a long tradition of 
public management over energy resources. The critics claim that establishment of RME puts 
traditional policy making dominated by national ministerial bureaucracies - Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MEP) and Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Agency (NVE) – 
in jeopardy, by transferring more and more decision-making powers to the EU-level.  
Indeed, a quick literature review provides some evidence to support such claims. Several 
scholars have indicated that the drive toward harmonization of public policy within EU member 
and affiliated states challenges national administrative sovereignty, characterized by national 
political-administrative control over state administration and public governance processes 
(Trondal and Kuhn, 2019), and rises novel problems of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability (Majone 2007). In particular, it can be argued that EU’s agency system 
mechanism of close cooperation with national agencies provides EU Commission with 
necessary tools for direct control over application of EU legislature within member-states and 
                                               
1 RME is the regulatory authority for the turnover of electrical energy and natural gas according to the Energy 
Act § 2-3 and the Natural Gas Act § 4, cf. the Natural Gas Regulations § 1-4. 
 7 
affiliated countries. As national regulatory agencies become more and more embedded in EU 
networks, ministries may find themselves more often ‘bypassed’ when it comes to important 
policy issues. According to Groenleer (2011:556) ‘networking at the EU level allows national 
agencies to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis their principals at the national level’. Bach and 
Ruffing (2013) study concluded that involvement in formal agency networks was positively 
correlated with increasing levels of policy-development autonomy. This increasingly more 
salient multi-level embeddedness of national civil servants rises sensitive questions around their 
individual accountability. Their increasingly ‘double-hatted’ role (Egeberg 2006) as part of 
both national and European administrations makes it less transparent who these modern public 
executives work for and to whom they are accountable for.   
Given the increasing role and responsibilities that national professional agencies are being 
delegated in sector specific policy implementation and development, more research is needed 
into de facto operations of these agencies. The inquiry into day-to-day operations of national 
agencies will allow us to grasp full effects of their creation and design in terms of accountability 
and control.   
1.1 Research Question  
The broad aim of this research is to assess how, and to what extent increased incorporation of 
national agencies into multi-level administrative structures of EU challenge national 
administrative sovereignty. In particular, the study tries to grasp effects of RME participation 
in the EU network of energy regulators on established patterns of national policy making and 
administrative behavior within the agency. In order to answer these broad questions, this 
research tries to address the following research question(s):  
What characterizes and explains administrative behavior inside RME as an actor embedded in 
the multi-level administrative structure of EU? 
 
In the existing literature, the role of agencies and their potential impact have often been derived 
from their legal competences and formal design features (Chiti 2000 in Busuioc el al 2012). It 
is often assumed that agencies do what their creators want them to do, and they are expected to 
develop in ways intended by their creators (Busuioc el al 2012). The administrative behavior 
of agency officials is generally also associated with and causally explained by their legal status 
which provides binding instructions and mandates for their actions (Trondal 2010).  However, 
legal mandates may not be sufficient explanatory factors for administrative behavior inside the 
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agencies. Providing organizational members with only broad guidelines for action, legal 
mandates may leave significant leeway for organizational members to define and shape their 
internal routines and roles, and ‘interpret or even reinterpret their basic missions’ (Kiewiet and 
Mccubbins 1991 in Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2013). Moreover, administrative behavior within 
agencies embedded into multilevel administrative structures is composed of the multiple 
complementary institutions, actors, interests, decision-making arenas, values, norms and 
cleavages (Schmidt 2006 in Trondal 2011). Consequently, agents within these organizations 
have to attend to and act upon a multidimensional set of at times conflicting roles and identities 
(Marcussen and Trondal 2011). Administrative behavior within these agencies will ultimately 
be influenced by how the trade-offs between these diverse behavioral logics are balanced by 
individual officials (Wilson 1989:327 in Trondal 2010).  Hence, in order to understand and 
capture the real dynamics of an agency’s administrative behavior we need to explore internal 
dimensions of its life. Studying role perceptions of individual decision-makers and their 
organizational context can provide valuable insights in this regard. Role perceptions can be a 
good predictor of administrative behavior as they provide ‘conceptions of reality, standards of 
assessment, affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action’ 
(March and Olsen, 1995:30 in Trondal 2004:10). ‘What people do and how they do it depends 
upon how they see themselves and their world, and this in turn depends upon the concepts 
through which they see’ (Pitkin 1972:1 in Trondal 2004:10). 
 
‘Unpacking’ organizational factors, on the other hand, can help us to understand the conditions 
under which actors form/transform their preferences, roles and identities (Egeberg 2004). There 
are studies documenting that administrative behavior within organizations can be shaped by 
organizational structure (Trondal 2007; Trondal 2010; Trondal 2011; Kühn and Trondal 2018; 
Vestlund 2017). Trondal (2010) has empirically assessed the relationship between bureaucratic 
structure and administrative behavior within three international bureaucracies – the 
Commission, OECD Secretariat, and the WTO Secretariat – and concluded that administrative 
behavior among international civil servants was profoundly shaped by the bureaucratic 
structures of international bureaucracies in which they participated. Moreover, variation in 
administrative behavior across and within international bureaucracies were profoundly shaped 
by (1) the accumulation of relevant administrative capacities at the executive center, and 
secondly, (2) their horizontal specialization.  
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There are also studies claiming that behavioral logics of the agents within multi-contextual 
organizations can be influenced by the international institutions in which they are embedded 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004 in Trondal 2010). For example, international bureaucracies that 
are embedded in intergovernmental IOs are assumed less likely to act independently of their 
member-states than international bureaucracies within supranational IOs – such as the 
Commission (Trondal 2010). Yet, another strand of research, stresses socialization and re-
socialization potential of institutions (Trondal 2004; Trondal 2007; Hooghe 2005; Egeberg 
1999) as the main factor affecting behavioral logics within compound bureaucracies. What all 
these studies have in common is that they emphasize ‘contextualized and endogenous decision-
making behavior, identity and belonging’ (Trondal 2001). They point to the forces that may 
bias the decision-making behavior of agency officials, eventually biasing the formulation and 
execution of public policy, and ultimately administrative behavior and decisions (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004 in Trondal 2017). 
These insights constitute a starting point for this research which aims to study actual 
administrative practices inside RME by examining role perceptions of individual decision-
makers. As pointed out by Christiansen et al (2001 in Trondal 2004:10) ‘studying the roles 
enacted by actors participating in policymaking structures of the EU is important for 
understanding European integration through the transformative processes happening at the level 
of individual-decision makers. However, one has to acknowledge that connection between role 
perceptions and behavior is not always straightforward. In particular, in contexts where 
individuals carry multiple roles which can be in conflict with each other, role orientations may 
be deficient predictors of behavior. 
 
1.2 Background  
Since 2009 Integrated EU Energy Market Policy has become a central pillar of the 
Europeanization project. With its Third Energy package EU aims to achieve ambitious political, 
regulatory and/or technical demands of the energy policy through a more centralized 
governance structure. This governance structure consists of slightly hierarchized trans-
European network in which independent National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and EUs 
Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) constitute significant nodes.  
 
At the EU level, networks of national experts have long been seen as the best way to achieve 
uniformity in policy application and bring about a true ‘community of views and action’ 
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(Dehousse 1997:254). Within these networks, national experts in charge of implementation of 
Community policies can discuss their experiences and work out common solutions to the 
problems that emerge in the implementation phase. Thus, networking is seen as a best way to 
ensure behavioral similarity among national actors. However, networking is not a new 
phenomenon within ‘European Administrative Space’ (Trondal and Peters 2013 in Joosen and 
Brandsma 2017:423). For instance, the Nordic power market (Nord Pool) is a regional success 
story which proved that regional initiatives are well suited to fuse energy markets between EU 
member states. This bottom-up initiative resulted in the integration of the electricity markets of 
all Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). What is new is that since mid-
1990s, EU started to institutionalize existing networks of national experts, phenomenon termed 
in the literature as ‘agencification’. By ‘agencification’ is meant a process at the EU level in 
which a quickly growing number of EU agencies is being delegated responsibility to administer 
and bring stability to networks of national experts and officials involved in the implementation 
of Community policies (Dehousse 1997) in their respective policy areas. To achieve their policy 
objectives, EU agencies are mandated a wide range of (semi)-regulatory, decision-making, 
monitoring, and coordination tasks. Networks of national experts facilitate the work of the EU 
agencies by ensuring that they have access to resources, that the information at the European 
level is based on equivalent comparable data from the member states, and by encouraging the 
harmonization of measurement or data comparison methods (Kreher 1997:237). On the other 
hand, EU agencies provide more administrative capacity for feeding supranational concerns 
into the decision process, also at the policy formulation stage (Egeberg et al 2009). Overall, 
‘agencification’ in the energy policy area could strengthen the EU’s capacity for policy 
development under the umbrella of the Energy Union.  
According to Hix (1998:54 in Jordan 2001:196) ‘via a complex web of networks and quasi-
autonomous agencies, the EU is transforming politics and government at the European and 
national levels into a system of multi-level governance’. This EU-induced form of transnational 
governance might challenge basic legal and administrative principles of administrative 
sovereignty underlaying relations between member states and the European Commission 
(Joosen and Brandsma 2017:424). In particular, it seems to undermine basic principles 
stipulated in Article 189 of EC Treaty stating that implementation of the Community legislation 
shall be executed by ‘the choice of form and methods’ (Article 189, EC Treaty in Dehousse 
1997:248) at the national level. This arrangement, the so-called indirect implementation, allows 
a great deal of national autonomy and control over state administration and public governance 
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processes within member states but, at the same time, exposes Community policies to 
considerable influence from national politics and administrative traditions (Dehousse 1997b; 
Knill 2001; Olsen 2003 in Martens, 2006, 124) which hampers a uniform and effective 
enforcement of Community legislation.  
Egeberg and Trondal (2013) claim that EUs strengthened institutional structure pulls 
implementation practice towards more direct implementation. In particular, strengthening of 
the executive institutions at the EU level, such as EU-agencies and Commission, with 
organizational capacity, and supervisory and control mandates over implementation process at 
national level, facilitates much stronger involvement in policy implementation processes within 
member states and third countries. ‘Direct implementation severely circumscribes the scope for 
policy adaptation according to ‘local’ needs because it tends to hamper inputs from the local 
political bodies (parliaments, ministries) into the implementation process’ (Egeberg et al. 
2009:3). Formal and, in many cases, also real administrative independence of national 
regulatory agencies from national ministries facilitates direct coupling of EU executive 
institutions to these bodies. As such, when implementing EU legislation at the national level, 
agencies may be more willing to act on behalf of the Commission or ‘sister agencies’ in other 
countries rather than according to the objectives and priorities of their respective parent 
ministries (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Martens 2006, 2008 in Bach and Ruffing 2013). This 
makes national agencies in practice to a direct executive authority of the EU legislation within 
a nation state. 
Research examining effects of national agencies’ participation in the EU networks on national 
administrations and established patterns of policy making has blossomed since 1990s. Some 
studies have examined how agencies’ participation in European networks affects the 
relationship between agencies and their parent ministries. Engagement in the European 
networks of sector specific policy development changes environment of national experts and 
officials in charge of implementation of EU legislation policies at the national level. By taking 
part in such networks, national agencies can become more autonomous and empowered in 
relation to their parent ministries. According to Egeberg (2006:9 in Bach and Ruffing 2013:717) 
involvement with the trans-European networks allows national agencies to ‘bypass’ their parent 
ministry because networks provide agencies with an opportunity to directly engage in and 
influence European policymaking rather than supporting the ministry, as is the case in national 
policymaking. Indeed, Bach and Ruffing (2013), based on the comprehensive survey covering 
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all federal agencies in Germany, found that national agencies’ involvement in the European 
networks strengthened their policy development autonomy as a result of ‘spill-over effects of a 
task environment requiring horizontal coordination among expert bodies for effective problem-
solving’ and limited capacity of parent ministries to control agency activities. They concluded 
that information asymmetries and remoteness of decision-making exacerbate control problems 
for the ministries (Bach et al 2015) while at the same time empowers the agency officials. 
Findings in Danielsen and Yesilkagit (2014) comparative case study of national competition 
authorities in Norway, Sweden and Netherlands suggest that across all three national 
competition regimes, the national competition authorities have become strengthened vis-à-vis 
domestic resort ministries as a function of the institutionalization of the European competition 
network, where network membership ‘extended the structural and organizational leverage of 
individual authorities, and incorporated them into a larger and more resourceful aggregate 
actor’. Abraham Newman (2008 in Bach et al 2015) showed that national agencies, by pooling 
their expertise and administrative resources via a transnational network, have been able to defy 
their parent ministries and the European Commission when these actors were hesitant to impose 
regulations on the storage and use of personal data within the EU. Martens (2008:32 in Bach 
and Ruffing 2013) argues that the processes of ‘agencification’ in many European countries 
opened up a ‘window of opportunity for a new and transnational role for the regulatory 
agencies’, possibly turning them into a ‘run-away bureaucracies.’ All these findings suggest 
that national agencies’ involvement in the European networks changes agencies’ role in relation 
to the parent ministry, especially when it comes to policy formulation, thus ‘challenging the 
established division of labor between ministries and agencies and undermining ministries’ 
capacity to control agencies, which is traditionally considered to be the main source of 
legitimacy of administrative action’ (Bach and Ruffing 2013).  
 
Other studies examined the effects of national agencies’ network participation on established 
patterns of behavior and practices within national administrative systems. In particular, the 
more recent public administration debate within MLA approach directs attention towards 
changes in the beliefs and role perceptions of national civil servants involved in European 
networks (Trondal et al. 2010 in Trondal 2017). These studies, rich in surveys of national civil 
servants active in committees and working groups of the European Commission and the Council 
of Ministers (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2004; Trondal 2007; Kühn and 
Trondal 2018; Marcussen and Trondal 2011; Hooghe 2005; Scheinman and Field 1972), 
demonstrate that participation in the European networks has an impact on preference formation 
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and behavior of national civil servants, and that this impact is largely mediated by 
organizational and/or socialization factors. Several studies demonstrate that through 
participation in trans-European policy networks national civil servants are able to supplement 
local, national role orientations with supranational (cosmopolitan) once. For instance, in 
Scheinman and Field’s study (1972:133 in Egeberg 1999:1) ten out of twenty-three interviewed 
national officials sensed that through their community experience they adopted a more 
‘European’ orientation than they had before. In his study of domestic (Swedish and Danish) 
civil servants embedded in EU committees, Trondal (2004) found that national civil servants 
attending EU committees supplement pre-existing role perceptions (national and/or sectoral) 
with supranational roles due to intensity of participation on EU committees. 
 
This study aims to contribute to this second strand of research. In particular, it aims to examine 
and explain administrative behavior within Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority, enmeshed 
into European network of energy regulators, by studying role perceptions of individual 
decision-makers. The overall goal is to increase knowledge of European integration by studying 
the transformative processes taking place at the individual level.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
To build my argument I use several theoretical contributions. Role theory and insights from 
recent institutional scholarship are used to build role expectations for RME. Role theory as 
specific field of social sciences concerns itself with patterns of human conduct – roles; with 
expectations, identities, and social positions; and with context and social structure as well as 
with individual response (Biddle 1979). From this theoretical frame of reference, organizations 
can be understood as systems of interdependent roles, the occupants of which communicate to 
each other, often implicitly, expectations about ‘how to behave’ and ‘what has to be done’ 
(Lizzio and Wilson 2009:72). Moreover, actors with multiple organizational embeddedness are 
exposed to several, at times competing, organizational logics and decision-making dynamics, 
and are therefore expected to develop multiple preferences, roles and identities promoted by 
these contexts. Taking into consideration organizational context of RME, this study postulates 
that three role conceptions / behavioral predispositions can be relevant for RME officials – 
departmental (the bureaucrat), professional (independent expert) and /or supranational 
(European adviser) role conceptions. 
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Insights from organization theory as well as social constructivists literature are used to develop 
theoretical expectations about influence of organizational and social factors on preferences, role 
and identity formation within RME. Organization theory is founded on the assumption that 
different organizational factors contribute to the enactment of certain identities, roles and codes 
of conduct. As such, one can easily alter behavior within an organization by changing the 
organizational factors, such as organizational structure, organizational affiliation, 
organizational location, organizational temporality, and/or organizational demography. In this 
study, I discuss two organizational factors, organizational structure and organizational location, 
and empirically examine their impact on the administrative behavior within RME.  
 
Social constructivists literature studies the initial construction and formation of identities, role 
conceptions and codes of conduct (Trondal 2001:3). It argues that the institutional and social 
contexts embedding actors have some fundamental implications for the behavior, identities and 
roles enacted by those actors (Trondal 2001:4). Hence, social constructivists views identity, 
roles and/or interests as a ‘relational ontology’ (Ruggie 1998:4) where ‘the identities, interests 
and behavior of political agents are socially constructed by collective meaning, interpretations, 
and assumptions about the world’ (Adler 1997:324 in Trondal 2001:5). In addition, it attributes 
identity and role formation to the ideational factors, such as culture, norms and ideas.  A social 
constructivist theory complements the organizational accounts of role and identity formation, 
which see roles and identities as systemic and based on the material factors, with accounts that 
see the roles and identities as a product of socialization processes. In this way, social 
constructivist theory allows us to see individual roles and identities as a product of a long 
evolutionary process, which has its history, culture and characteristics.  
 
1.3 Case Selection  
The theoretical focus of the study is viewed and explicated through a single case study of the 
Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority (RME). RME was designated by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MEP) as a single regulatory authority for energy and gas in 2019. It is 
organized as a legally distinct and functionally independent unit inside Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Agency (NVE) – a professional agency under the Ministry.  
 
Case selection was driven by several factors. RME is chosen as an object of this study due to 
the academic relevance of the case in focus. Current focus of the integration research on 
behavior of agents participating in the multi-level administrative structures of EU makes it 
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highly relevant to investigate role perceptions of civil savants within national agencies strongly 
embedded within this context. In this respect, the RME agency represents an information-reach 
case as the agency is both created following the decree from the EU, and has a legally-binding 
obligation to participate in the EU network of energy regulators (ACER).  
 
The case for this study was also selected because of its criticality. A critical case demonstrates 
that ‘if it happens here in will happen anywhere’ (Patton 1990:236 in Emmel 2014:). RME can 
be seen as a critical case or a ‘least likely’ case because of certain case characteristics. Firstly, 
as a new administrative body on a political-administrative scene, the agency has not yet 
managed to develop a distinct sense of purpose and an agency-identity to accompany it in order 
to craft a distinct ‘space’ in the face of potential environmental threats to its existence 
(Eisenstadt 1959). Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the patterns of behaviour inside RME 
still reflect the national political and administrative cultures and beliefs. Moreover, the 
normative element of the Norwegian administrative jurisdiction under which RME operates is 
expected to exert a strong reinforcing effect on these patterns of behavior. Also, given the 
politicization of the energy sector due to its high importance for the Norwegian foreign policy, 
and security and defense policy it unlikely that Norwegian political leadership will start to think 
and talk about energy policy in the exclusively economic terms any time soon. All these factors 
combined will most likely make it more difficult for RME officials to develop any strong 
allegiance to the European level. 
 
1.4 Key Findings 
The empirical findings in this study suggest that administrative behavior of RME officials are 
located on the functional expert - bureaucrat dimension, and that it is systematically shaped by 
the organizational structure. In particular, the horizontal specialization of the RME agency 
along functional lines wields the strongest effect on the formation of the departmental role 
among RME officials. Concomitantly, the inter-organizational vertical specialization whereby 
the RME is structurally separated from the Ministry wields the strongest effect on the formation 
of the professional/expert role among RME officials. These patterns of behavior epitomize the 





The research paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines theoretical framework for this study. 
The theoretical framework draws on contributions from several research areas to develop not 
only the role conceptions for RME officials but also the explanation for these role conceptions. 
Chapter 3 outlines research design and data collection method as applied in this research. 
Chapter 4 presents empirical findings. This chapter is divided in two parts; in the first part of 
the chapter, a short introduction to the energy sector governance in both Norway and EU is 
provided. Also, the external dimensions of the RME agency, its legal statues, institutional 
design, competencies and duties, as well as relationship to other actors within EU energy policy 
network are presented. The second part of the chapter focuses on the internal dimensions of the 
RME agency by presenting data from the interviews. In chapter 5 the empirical data is analyzed 
based on the theoretical propositions as outlined in chapter 2. In the concluding chapter 6, I 
briefly summarize the results of the study and indicate their broader implications, as well as I 





CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents theoretical framework for this research. In this research, several 
theoretical contributions are used to build the argument and analyze the findings. Role theory 
and insights from recent institutional scholarship are used to construct role sets for RME 
officials. Insights from organization and social constructivists theory are used to develop 
theoretical expectations about influence of organizational and social factors on preferences, role 
and identity formation inside RME.  
 
2.1 Role Theory 
Organizations can be understood as systems of interdependent roles and modes of behavior, the 
occupants of which communicate to each other, often implicitly, expectations about ‘how to 
behave’ and ‘what has to be done’ (Lizzio and Wilson 2009:72). Organizational role can be 
understood as ‘a generalized receipt for action as well as a normative system of self-reference 
that provides spontaneous feelings of allegiance to organized communities’ (Bevir et al. 2003: 
4; Mayntz 1999:83 in Trondal 2007:1114). In the conception of role there is by assumption a 
close fit between behavior and disposition (attitude, value) as ‘what people do and how they do 
it depends upon how they see themselves and their world, and this in turn depends upon the 
concepts through which they see’ (Pitkin 1972:1 in Trondal 2004:10).  
 
From the standpoint of the organization, the creation of this organizational role and personality 
is essential to rationality in administrative decision (Simon 1957:279). By specifying particular 
values, objectives, facts and alternatives, organizational role creates frames of 
reference/premises for organizationally correct decision-making. ‘Through subjugation to 
organizationally determined goals, and through gradual absorption of these goals into his own 
attitudes, each organizational member acquire an organizational personality rather distinct from 
his/hers personality as an individual’ (Simon 1957:278). ‘When organizational members 
identify with their organization, they act spontaneously in its interest, without being told exactly 
what to do’ (Mayntz 1999:83 in Trondal 2004:9). In other words, individual decisions in 
organizations are guided by the values and objectives of that particular organization 
(organizational value scale) rather than individual motives (personal value scale) of individual 
decision-makers (Simon 1957:278).  
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Overall, role imposition is an important mechanism for constructing an environment for 
decision within organizations as ‘it assures that decisions will be made responsibly and 
impersonally’ (Simon 1957:294).  The roles to be adopted and beliefs and values to be accepted 
are generated by the organizational structures and institutional processes. Recent institutional 
scholarship suggests that agents embedded in multiple institutional contexts are often 
confronted with multiple institutional ‘logics’ or ‘broad belief systems that specify the 
boundaries of organizational field, its rules of membership, and the role identities and 
appropriate organizational arrangements of its constituent communities’ (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2009 in Buchanan and Bryman 2009). They have to learn to balance these multiple 
norms, rules and behavior expectations effectively. Ultimately, the way in which expectations 
of these roles are balanced by the organizational members will have an impact on the 
administrative decision-making within the organization.  
 
RME operates in a complex environment characterized by multiple organizational 
memberships, diversity of actors and institutional logics. The work of RME is embedded in two 
arenas of strategic interaction: departmental and interdepartmental preparation and co-
ordination arenas at the national level; and policy network arenas at the European level. It is 
reasonable to expect that these two rather different organizational contexts mobilize different 
expectations to roles and code of conduct among RME officials. As a specialized regulatory 
agency with specific task and competencies RME is stuffed by experts responsible for efficient 
regulation of the electricity and gas market. Norms and values associated with scientific 
knowledge and expertise are expected to play an important role within the agency. Agencies’ 
embeddedness within national administration facilitates infusion of domestic political and 
administrative cultures and beliefs into the agency. As part of national administration, RME’s 
operation is likely to entail a strategic effort to produce timely, coherent and sensible national 
policy positions, and to build support for these at the European level. Hence, embeddedness 
within national administrative apparatus is expected to drive forward local, unit-centered 
preferences and role conceptions among RME officials.  
 
On the other hand, participation in the European network of energy regulators exposes RME 
officials to institutional logics particular to this context. Created to promote cooperation 
between national regulators, this network arguably ‘embed strong norms of professionalism, 
neutrality and independence’ (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014:357). On the other side, mutual 
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influence and integration between network participants and EU institutions might also 
contribute to development of supranational norms and values that ‘differentiate individual 
regulatory authority from strictly domestic political and administrative cultures and beliefs’ 
(Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014:358). Participation in the European network of energy 
regulators entails strategic effort to contribute to effective European energy policy development 
at the EU level, and policy implementation at the national level where RME officials are 
expected to behave like independent experts and efficient policy regulators. Hence, 
participation in the European network of energy regulators is expected to be conducive to 
professional/epistemic and/or supranational role conceptions among RME officials.  
 
Based on the above, I assume that RMEs multiple institutional embeddedness encourages 
development of multiple preferences, roles and identities among RME officials. In particular, 
RME officials may evoke the following roles perceptions: departmental role perception of the 
bureaucrat, epistemic role perception of the independent expert and/or a supranational role 
perception of the European advisor. 
 
2.1.1 Departmental Role / The Bureaucrat  
Departmental role conception is related to the idea of ‘civil servants as Weberian officials who 
attach their identity towards their organizational unit, and abide by the administrative rules and 
proper procedures of their organizational bureaucracy’ (Olsen 2010 in Marcussen and Trondal 
2011:599). Departmental role implies that public service officials coordinate their tasks and 
make decisions in accordance with the formalized roles, routines and rules prescribed by some 
higher authority (Trondal and Kiland 2009:7).  
 
Following this role perspective, RME officials are expected to place their primary allegiance 
towards their organizational unit where they spend most of their time and energy. 
Organization’s objectives specified by the parent Ministry and/or NVE will serve as the major 
value-premise for administrative decision-making. Coordination of tasks and administrative 
decision-making will be based on the standard roles, routines and rules prescribed by the legal 
mandate and other relevant processual routines. Overall, their behavior is expected to be subject 




2.1.2 Epistemic Role / Independent Expert  
The epistemic role conception implies that agents participating in the European networks enjoy 
a great deal of discretion, being influenced primarily by external professional reference groups 
- epistemic communities (Asher 1983 in Marcussen and Trondal 2011). They pride themselves 
on their expertise - ‘a body of knowledge valued by society and political actors’ (Haas 1995:15).  
According to Haas (1995:16) members of epistemic communities not only hold in common a 
set of principled and causal beliefs (a value-based rationale for the social action of community 
members), but also have shared notions of validity (intersubjective, internally defined criteria 
for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise), and a shared policy 
enterprise (a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed). Their authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in 
a particular domain is based on their recognized expertise within that domain. The combination 
of shared causal beliefs and shared principled beliefs held by epistemic community members 
inform the advice they offer (Haas 1995).  
 
Following this role perspective, RME officials see themselves as belonging to a professional or 
scientific group that supersedes their immediate organizational affiliation. They are expected 
to pursue activities that reflect ‘standards and practices of their professional group, including 
colleague control, free exchange of information, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and 
personal professional development’ (Kornhauser 1962; Hagstrom 1965 in Stryker and Macke 
1978:77) above their organization’s. Their primary allegiance will thus be directed towards 
members (experts) of the European network of energy regulators that share their principle 
beliefs. Decision-making is expected to be influenced by ‘considerations of scientific and 
professional correctness and the power of the better argument’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2000 in 
Trondal 2007) rather than ‘the preexisting political interests or preferences of high-level 
policymakers and/or their individual careers’ (Haas 1995).  
2.1.3 Supranational Role / European Adviser  
Supranational role conception emphasizes actors’ feelings of loyalty and allegiance to the 
supranational norms, interests, policies and politics. The interaction at the EU level may 
encourage a ‘fusion’ of ‘national’ and ‘EU interests’ that requires a problem-solving policy-
making orientation (Wessels 1997). As such, supranational role implies a ‘shift of loyalty’ and 
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a ‘sense of community’ that is integral and endogenous to actors’ self-perceptions (Deutsch et 
al. 1957:5; Haas 1958:16; Herrmann and Brewer 2004:6 in Trondal 2007:1113).  
 
Following this role perspective, active participation in the European network of energy 
regulators, is expected to promote an ‘organizational personality’ that is rather distinct from the 
departmental and epistemic roles previously internalized (Searing 1991:1249) by RME 
officials. When evoking the supranational role, RME officials are expected to emphasize 
utilitarian benefits, collective system of decision-making, and demonstrate favorable attitude 
towards integration project as a whole. They are also expected to be more sensitive to signals 
from the European level, in particular interests and policy positions promoted by ACER and/or 
other EU institutions in which they participate. Correspondingly, the importance of the role of 
‘European adviser’ who helps the domestic systems mediate and internalize the ‘European’ 
becomes increasingly salient (Kerrmans 1996:223 in Herrmann 2004:92).  
 
Conflicting expectations (normative prescriptions) of these roles and/or confusion in immediate 
interactions (individual’s experience of conflicting expectations) can cause role conflict 
(Stryker and Macke 1978). For instance, the values and orientations of the epistemic 
communities can contradict the norms or survival needs of the employing organization (Stryker 
and Macke 1978:77). Hence, epistemic communities may experience strain when pressured to 
adopt organizational standards. On the other hand, roles may complement each other and/or be 
configured into a system of multiple loyalties. Indeed, some studies demonstrate that national 
and supranational roles correlate positively (Licata 2000; Risse 2001 in Trondal 2004). 
According to Herrmann et al (2004) multiple group identities can be nested, cross-cutting 
and/or separate. Nested roles are conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls 
where one role represents a subunit of the other. For example, national identities are subsumed 
by supranational identities. Cross-cutting identities mean that members of one identity group 
are also members of another identity group. Separate identities represent nonoverlapping 
memberships, where different groups that a person belongs to are distinct from one another. 
Herrmann et al. (2004) claim that understanding changes in organizational identity requires not 
only understanding which groups constitute significant social identities for organizational 
members but also how their multiple identities are configured and related to one another in the 
dynamic system of multiple loyalties. The institutions of the EU may be subjectively 
represented for some individuals as superordinate group within which national identities are 
nested, but for others their European identity may subjectively cross-cut their national identity. 
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This difference in subjective representation may have a lot to do with whether European and 
national loyalties are experienced as compatible or in conflict (Herrmann et al. 2004:10).  
 
The above indicates that RME officials may face cross-cutting role pressures between the 
departmental, epistemic, and/or supranational role conceptions. Whether these multiple roles 
lead to a role conflict will depend on the individual’s ability to handle competing role 
expectations. While some individuals may find it difficult to isolate their national and European 
role perceptions into separate domains, others will easily integrate demands of multiple roles.  
To summarize, I assume that RME officials can enact the following repertoire of roles:  
 
Table 1: Role Repertoires within RME 










European network of energy 
regulators 
ACER/EU Commission 
Decision making / 
logic of action  
Task portfolio 
considerations direct 
decision making within 
RME 
Policy/sector considerations 
direct decision making 
within RME 
‘European’ considerations 
direct decision making 
within RME  
Role expectations  Attention to task portfolio / 
organizational concerns 
Attention to functional needs 
of the policy area / sector  
Attention to EU-wide policy 
concerns 
Preferences Organizational/Local Expertise Utilitarian / Collective 
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2.2 Organizational and Social Constructivists Theory 
Another question to answer is what factors can explain variation in administrative decision-
making behavior of agency officials? What can explain that certain roles and administrative 
behaviors are more salient to the agency officials compared to others? To answer this question, 
it is necessary to unpack organizational context in which RME officials interact. This study 
uses insights from organizational and social-constructivist theory to provide explanation for 
variation in administrative behavior within organizations. From the organizational perspective, 
organizational factors, such as organizational affiliation, organizational structure, 
organizational location, and organizational demography, can contribute to the enactment of 
particular identities, roles and codes of conduct. Social constructivists approach, on the other 
hand, postulates that the social contexts embedding actors have some fundamental implications 
for the behavior, identities and roles enacted by those actors (Trondal 2001:4). ‘This approach 
highlights the role of institutional learning, ‘cultural match’ across systems, ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, argumentative persuasion and regulative rules’ (Trondal 2001:7).  
 
In the following, I will discuss two organizational variables: organizational structure and 
organizational location, which are of particular relevance for this study, and the social 
constructivists variable of socialization and make causal linkages between these variables and 
formation of particular role conceptions among RME officials.  
 
2.2.1 Organizational Structure 
Organizational theory literature suggests that the way organization is structured affects 
behaviour of organizational members. This literature draws heavily on the insights from 
cognitive psychology postulating that the evocation of roles is ultimately governed by the 
individual need for uncertainty reduction as regards their ‘perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and 
behaviors’ (Hogg and Terry 2000:124 in Trondal 2004:11). According to Scott (1981 in 
Egeberg 2004) ‘organizational structure represents a normative structure composed of rules and 
roles specifying, more or less clearly, who is expected to do what and how’.  Hence, by defining 
the interests and goals to be pursued and concerns to be emphasized by organizational members, 
organizational structure simplifies cognitive and normative search processes and reduce 
cognitive uncertainty (Checkel 2005). From this follows that identities and roles conceptions 
of organizational members will most likely be affected by interests and concerns that are clearly 
embodied in the organizational structure (Egeberg 2006). Within organizational perspective, 
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identities and roles are often seen as relatively easy to mould and remould on the basis of 
organizing and reorganizing organizational structures (Nkomo and Cox Jr 1996 in Trondal 
2001:6). Reorganizing from one principle of organization to another, changes the flow of 
information available to each decision-maker, which ultimately frame decision-maker’s goals, 
preferences and responses (Sevón 1996 in Trondal 2001).  
Organization planners can subdivide and specialize activities in such a manner that the 
psychological forces of role identification will contribute to correct decision-making.  
Horizontal specialization refers to the way tasks are linked or de-coupled from each other at 
one level (Egeberg 2004). Tasks can be distributed horizontally among organizational units 
based on the principle of territory, major purpose/sector, process/function and/or clientele 
served (Gulick 1937 in Egeberg 2004). Each of these mobilizes its particular goals, operational 
styles and cleavages of conflict, which often encourages fragmentation of national 
bureaucracies. For instance, horizontal specialization according to the principle of territory 
tends to cause ‘spatial perspectives and encourage policy-makers to focus on territorial 
concerns’ (Vestlund 2017:65). On the other hand, specialization according to the principle of 
function is expected to ‘activate administrative styles where coordination and conflict patterns 
tend to be channelled within sectoral portfolios’ (Trondal 2017). This is likely to bias decision-
making dynamics inwards towards the organizational unit, where preferences, contact patterns, 
roles and loyalties are directed towards sectoral portfolio and organizational unit. Horizontal 
specialization according to the principle of purpose may also ‘foster sectoral horizons among 
decision-makers contributing to policy standardisation across territorial units’ (Egeberg 2004) 
where similar problems enable interaction and resource pooling among organizations in search 
of viable solutions.    
Vertical specialization denotes vertical hierarchies of rank and command within and across 
organizations. According to Lægreid and Olsen (1978:31 in Trondal 2017) these hierarchies are 
able to guide the decision-making behavior evoked by civil servants through discipline and 
control. Vertical specialization can be of two types: intra-organizational and/or inter-
organizational. Intra-organizational specialization specifies vertical hierarchies of rank and 
command within the same organization. Formal position within organizational hierarchy can 
have implications for individual behavior as it exposes organizational members to different 
realities of ‘mutually exclusive problems, alternatives, and solutions’ (Trondal 2017). Some 
studies show that officials in higher-ranked positions tend to identify more frequently with 
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organizations as wholes than officials in lower-ranked positions (Egeberg and Særtren 1999 in 
Kühn and Trondal 2019). Other studies show that officials in lower-ranked positions are less 
sensitive to signals from political leadership compared to officials in higher-ranked positions 
(Egeberg & Trondal 2009 in Trondal 2017). A relative degree of insulation from political 
leadership may make lower-ranked officials more sensitive to impulses from the EU level. 
According to Kühn and Trondal (2019) officials dealing with the EU are increasingly far from 
the political level and are strongly ‘Europeanized’ by being tightly interwoven and influenced 
by EU institutions. For instance, Trondal (2007) found a positive relationship between the 
formal rank position of seconded national experts (SNEs) in the EU Commission and the degree 
to which they evoke a supranational role. However, due to their rank within the Commission 
hierarchy, SNEs tend to put stronger emphasis on departmental and epistemic roles than on the 
supranational role.   
Inter-organizational specialization specifies vertical hierarchies of rank and command between 
organizations. Hierarchy between organizations ‘provides certain decision inputs, for example, 
a more general view of hierarchically superior unit compared to lower ranked units, that cannot 
easily be achieved through purely horizontal arrangements’ (Kühn and Trondal 2019:1379). 
Vertical specialization of administrative systems, where national agencies are organized at 
arm’s length from their respective ministries, became a common feature in all western 
democracies since 1980/90s after a series of reforms (generally termed New Public 
Management) in the public sector. There seem to be a conviction that this particular way of 
organizing national bureaucracy offers ‘greater transparency, expert authority, flexibility, better 
informed decisions and better policy implementation’ (Wolff and Schout, 2013: 306). Formal 
separation between the agency and its parent ministry minimizes formal steering from the 
ministerial level whereby agencies receive fewer instructions from the national political and 
administrative leadership. Structurally enabled de-prioritization of political concerns, as well 
as reduced political oversight provide more room for professional (expertise based) decision-
making, and can facilitate more independent interaction within transnational policy network. 
2.2.1.1 Expectations to Findings 
Based on the above, the following assumptions can be made regarding effects of organizational 
structure on administrative behavior within RME. Firstly, horizontal specialization of RME 
encourages several role conceptions among RME officials. RMEs horizontal specialization 
according to the principle of function (regulator function) is expected to channel RMEs 
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attention towards concerns related to their task portfolio, with stronger coordination and contact 
patterns along task and sectoral lines. Intensive intradepartmental coordination is expected to 
bias preferences of RME officials towards their organizational unit, and more likely to evoke 
departmental role conception.  
Moreover, functional specialization of RME is expected to promote policy enterprise across 
national boundaries. Interaction within transnational policy network and ACER is expected to 
make common policy interests and needs more salient for RME officials. At the same time, it 
might promote more centralized supranational administrative decision-making behaviour 
characterized by integration and mutual influence across national borders and levels of 
government (Vestlund 2017). Thus, shared specialization between RME and transnational 
policy network is expected to be conducive to professional role conception among RME 
officials where they will tend to affiliate and identify themselves with groups that likewise 
reflect or seek to promote energy policy interests. It can also be conducive to supranational role 
conception among RME officials ‘as communities of highly educated experts tend to fuel the 
development of supranational roles’ (Trondal 2007:1117). Here as well, officials’ position in 
the hierarchy is likely to affect the degree to which they identify with the supranational role 
perception. The officials on the operational level are expected to be more tightly interwoven 
and influenced by EU norms and values than officials in the leadership positions due to higher 
degree of insulation from political leadership.  
 
Secondly, vertical specialization of RME may encourage several identification patterns among 
RME officials. Intra-organizational vertical separation of RME leadership and officials from 
NVE’s leadership is expected to foster enactment of departmental role conception among RME 
officials. Moreover, the extent to which officials enact departmental role perception is more 
likely to affected by the officials’ position in the hierarchy. As such, evocation of the 
departmental role is expected to be stronger among RME officials in higher-ranked (leadership) 
positions than among officials in lower-ranked (technical) positions. The latter are more likely 
to identify with the professional and supranational role conceptions as a result of stronger 
involvement with technical issues, facilitated by relative degree of insulation from the political 
leadership, and tighter embeddedness into the European energy policy network, necessitated by 
common policy issues.  
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Inter-organizational vertical specialization is expected to foster professional role conception 
among RME officials. RME’s organization at arm’s length from the ministry is expected to 
make RME less sensitive to the political signals from the ministry. Professional and technical 
concerns at the agency level are expected to promote professional identification patterns among 
RME officials.  
 
2.2.2 Organizational Location (Locus) 
The issue of location of governmental institutions is the government’s responsibility and an 
administrative issue that falls within the government’s constitutional governing law. The 
geographical distance to political leadership has been stressed as beneficial for the autonomy 
and professionalism of the regulatory agencies. In particular, the physical distance between the 
political and professional public institutions will lead to less, but more formalized contact, and 
make it easier to trace potential trade-offs between the professional/administrative and political 
considerations.  
Several scholars have emphasized the effect of organizational location on administrative 
behavior within the organizations. Most organizations are still located in physical places and 
buildings. According to Egeberg (2004) ‘organizational location, like organizational structure, 
creates boundaries that focus the attention of decision-makers and help them to cope with 
complex reality’.  
Physical distance within and between organizational buildings encourages certain 
administrative styles as it affects contact patterns and coordination behavior (Egeberg 2003 in 
Egeberg 2004). For instance, segregation of organizational units in physical space encourages 
development of ‘local cultures’ (Hooghe 2005:878) because it facilitates more 
intradepartmental contact and coordination, and less contact and coordination between main 
organization and organizational units, rendering signals from the main organization less 
importance. Thus, segregation of organizational units is able to provide a more concrete 
rendering of individual identities through ‘perceived similarity, interaction, and task and goal 
interdependencies may facilitate a perception of entitativity – of being a grouplike’ (Ashford 
and Johnston 2001:35). On the other hand, concentration of organizational units in physical 
space, is likely to encourage higher degrees of interdepartmental contact and coordination, 
enabling transfer of common organizational identity from one unit into the other (Egeberg 2003 
in Egeberg 2004). This effect is likely to be reinforced by interdepartmental mobility which 
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seem to promote identification with common organizational norms and values and hinder 
identification with particular unit (Hooghe 2005:879). 
2.2.2.1 Expectations to Findings 
Based on the above, the following expectations can be made regarding effects of organizational 
location on administrative decision-making inside RME. RMEs location in the same building 
as NVE is likely to encourage higher degrees of formal and informal interdepartmental contact 
and mobility. High levels of contact between NVE’s departments are expected to transfuse 
NVE’s norms and values into RME’s decision-making process. By facilitating NVE’s 
organizational culture to flow freely through all organizational departments within NVE, co-
localization of RME and NVE is expected to perpetuate local bureaucratic roles and identities 
and hamper the development of the supranational roles and identities among RME officials. 
Physical proximity to various professional communities working within NVE is expected to be 
important supplier of competence-related knowledge and expertise. By complementing each 
other professional communities of RME and NVE are assumed to perpetuate the importance of 
the professional role of independent expertise.  
 
2.2.3 Socialization  
There is a growing strand of literature that assumes that institutions have the ability to form and 
change identity of agents participating in them through socialization. Socialization models of 
role evocation and change focus on the role of individual experience with the institution and its 
consequences for behaviour (Herrmann et al 2004). The theory assumes that individuals have 
a psychological need to minimize inconsistent beliefs in order to decrease information costs 
(Hooghe 2005:870). Socialization can be defined as a ‘process of inducting actors into the 
norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005:804). One mechanism by which this 
occurs is the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Checkel 2005:812) where conscious instrumental 
calculation (logic of consequences) has been replaced by conscious role playing. This is what 
Checkel (2005) identifies as Type I internalisation or socialization which implies that agents 
may behave appropriately by learning a role - acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act 
in accordance with expectations - irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. In 
other words, actors decide which role is appropriate to enact based on the particular situation 
and their perceptions of socially accepted patterns of behaviour in a given setting or community. 
As such, ‘role playing presupposes an agent’s passive, non-calculative acceptance of new roles 
evoked by certain environmental triggers’ (Checkel 2005:812). On the other hand, conscious 
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instrumental calculation can be replaced by ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Checkel 2005). This type 
of socialization Checkel (2005) calls for Type II internalisation or socialization which implies 
that agents can also adopt the norms, interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community 
of which they are a part. In other words, ‘whereas role-playing represents an intermediate level 
of socialization at the cognitive level, role internalization is a more complete form of 
socialization based on the mechanism of normative suasion’ (Johnston 2003; Zurn 2003 in 
Trondal 2004:9).  
 
Furthermore, socialization models allow for different degrees of experience with institutions 
among actors, with corresponding differences in depth and level of identification with those 
institutions (Herrmann et 1l. 2004:14).  As such, the probability of transition from Type I to 
Type II socialization increases with different degrees of experience with institutions. Following 
Checkel (2005:811), internalization of new role conceptions in line with community/group 
norms is more likely under the following institutional conditions: (1) agents are in settings 
where contact is long and sustained, and it has some significant duration; (2) agents are in 
settings where the contact is intense. Both conditions are positively related to the emergence of 
relatively stable social, normative and strategic networks that provide an autonomous impact 
on the participants’ perceptions of the strategic and appropriate behaviour (Atkinson and 
Coleman 1992:161; Hay and Richards 2000 in Trondal 2017) and development of ‘internalized 
norms like diffuse reciprocity, deep trust, mutual responsiveness, consensus and a ‘we-ness’ 
(Lewis, 2005:949 in Trondal 2007:1118).  
 
2.2.3.1 Expectations to Findings 
From the socialization perspective, the effect of socialization is assumed to be positively 
associated with the duration and the intensity of interaction among actors and/or exposure to 
certain institutions, norms and culture. As RME officials spend most of their time and energy 
in their organizational unit, it is expected that their organizational unit would be the most 
important and influential source of normative guidence for them. Being an employing 
organization, RME determines their obligations, expectations, information networks, incentives 
and sanctions (Egeberg 1999:5). Task interdependencies are expected to encourage more 
intradepartmental contact and coordination inside the RME unit. In its turn, the intensive 
intradepartmental contact and coordination is expected to make departmental role conception 
more salient for RME officials. 
 30 
At the same time, RME officials with regular and/or sustained contact with actors within the 
European network of energy regulators are more likely to be socialized into norms and 
expectations of the network. As pointed out before, this network can be a motor for both strong 
norms of professionalism, neutrality and independence, and/or European interests and 
preferences. Hence, RME officials with regular and/or sustained contact within this context are 
expected to identify more strongly with the professional and/or supranational roles than 
officials without regular and/or sustained contact within this context.  
To summarize, I make the following theoretical expectations with regards to effects of 
organizational and socialization variables on behavior (role perceptions) of RME officials:  
Table 2: Independent variables and expected effect on role perceptions 




RMEs horizontal specialization according to the principle of 
function is expected to channel RMEs attention towards 
concerns related to their task portfolio. Focus on the task 
portfolio is expected to increase intradepartmental contact and 
coordination, and be conducive to the departmental role among 
RME officials. 
Shared sectoral affiliation and specialization between RME and 
other agencies within European network of energy regulators is 
expected to foster interaction, expertise sharing, and mutual 
influence among network participants. Mutualisation of 
problems and solutions is expected to promote professional 
and/or collective decision-making within RME, thus fostering 
epistemic and supranational role among RME officials. 
 
Vertical specialization 
    Intra-organizational  
 




RME officials in higher-ranked positions are expected to evoke 
departmental role conception more strongly than officials in the 
lower-ranked positions. 
RME officials in the lower-ranked positions are expected to 
evoke professional (independent expert) and/or supranational 
(European adviser) role conceptions more strongly than 
officials in the higher-ranked positions.  
Vertical separation of RME from the MEP ensures RME 
considerable degree of independence from political leadership 
and allows the agency to concentrate on the technical decision-
making. It is thus expected that inter-organizational vertical 
specialization will be conducive to the professional / expert role 
perception among RME officials. 
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Organizational location  
 
RME’s physical proximity to various professional communities 
working inside NVE is expected to be conducive to 
development of the professional role among RME officials. 
The co-location of RME and NVE is expected to encourage 
higher degrees of interdepartmental contact and coordination, 
facilitating identification with the norms and values of the main 
organization. Hence, RMEs location is expected to make 
decision-making process inside RME more sensitive to signals 
from NVE, and hamper development of both the departmental 
and supranational roles.  
Socialization variables 
 




RME officials with extensive daily contact with actors within 
national administration (NVE and/or MEP) are more likely to 
enact the departmental/bureaucratic role conception. 
RME officials with extensive daily contact with actors within 
network of energy regulators are more likely to develop 
perceptions of belonginess to that group. Hence, they will more 
readily enact the epistemic role of independent expert and/or the 





CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD  
This section outlines strategy for data construction as applied in this study. In the following, I 
will outline the research methodology, sample, data collection methods and analysis techniques 
used in this study. Methodological challenges and mitigation measures will also be illuminated 
in the end of the chapter.  
 
3.1 Research Method 
The selection of the research methods was driven by the research purpose and problem 
definition (Bukve 2016). The main purpose of this study was to examine if RMEs participation 
in the European network of energy regulators affects established patterns of administrative 
behavior within the agency. The administrative behavior within organizations is seen as a 
consequence of material factors within organizations as well as institutional dynamics, where 
the outcome is predicated by the way actors subjectively perceive and act upon the 
organizational and institutional pressures. Hence, when studying administrative behavior 
within organizations it is important to focus on ‘how subjective experiences such as social roles, 
routines, patterns of interaction become typified by actors so as to appear as an objective reality’ 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2009 in Buchanan and Bryman 2009). 
The need to tap into internal dimensions of administrative behavior by using microlevel data, 
such as role perceptions, concrete experiences and practices of individual decision-makers 
within RME made the use of qualitative interpretative methodology more appropriate. 
Qualitative interpretive method allows to pay close attention to the ways in which actors make 
sense of, or apply meaning to institutional practices and/or structures (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2009 in Buchanan and Bryman 2009).  
 
3.1.1 Case Study  
The theoretical focus of the study is being viewed and explicated through a single case study 
of Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority (RME). RME operates in a complex environment 
characterized by multiple organizational memberships, diversity of actors and institutional 
logics. Administrative behavior within RME is assumed to be assimilated from these 
organizational structures and institutional processes that generate roles to be adopted and beliefs 
and values to be accepted. Hence, role perceptions held by RME officials will be influenced 
not only by the organizational structures and institutional logics of multiple organizational 
contexts. In order to understand role perceptions, and underlying conditions behind role 
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formation and change, we need to consider as much of the contextual information as possible 
and understand the behavioral conditions through the actor’s perspective (Zainal, 2007). Case 
study allows to capture this complexity and consider important contextual information by 
facilitating continued proximity to the studied reality and feedback from those under study 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006:223). It allows for a holistic approach to knowledge construction for the 
studied phenomenon, making it possible to reveal the interacting factors or mechanisms that 
lead to a given outcome (Yin, 1984:23). Moreover, the case study method is well suited to 
detect changes in patterns of behavior resultant not only from the overt elements of 
organizational structure but also from normative changes (changes in meanings and 
interpretations of a practice) which can be difficult to detect by other forms of analysis. ‘By 
allowing to trace the norms, values, and ideologies that underpin the overt elements of 
organizational structure, the case study thus offers a more compelling test of whether and why 
patterns of behavior can also be the consequence of institutional dynamics’ (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2009 in Buchanan and Bryman 2009). 
 
3.1.1.2 Sampling Frame 
Sampling decisions shall be made according to the purpose of the study. According to Ishak 
and Bakar (2014:29) the primary purpose of sampling for a qualitative researcher is ‘to collect 
specific cases or units of analysis that can clarify or deepen the researchers understanding about 
the phenomenon under study, and/or enhance what other researchers have learned about a 
particular social life or phenomenon’. The aim of this study was to explore administrative 
behavior inside RME by studying role perceptions of RME officials. The concomitant aim was 
to assess if RME’s embeddedness into European networks led to transformation of 
administrative behavior inside RME. 
 
The initial sampling strategy was theoretical; the intention was to select RME officials on the 
theoretical ground. One of the central criteria for selection of the interviewees was their active 
engagement with EUs network of energy regulators. It was essential to gain access to officials 
involved with policy harmonization at the EU level to assess if these officials report a change 
in the behavior due to greater exposure to the EU-level. However, to be able to assign this effect 
to the networking, I also needed to interview officials without this particular experience, and 
see if there were any differences in the subjective role perceptions.   
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Furthermore, to assess the effect of vertical intra-organizational specialization on behavior of 
individual decision-makers, it was necessary to get access to officials in both the lower-ranked 
positions and higher-ranked positions as these groups of officials were expected to emphasize 
different behavioral logics and, thus, demonstrate diverse role orientations. Hence, I planned to 
get in contact with as many of totally 63 RME officials as possible. 
 
I started to engage with RME in the middle of February 2019. With the help of my project 
supervisor I came into contact with an official in the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE) who facilitated my contact with RME. Through him, I got contact 
information to an official inside RME who agreed to help me to select interviewees for my 
project based on the sampling criteria that I had indicated in my initial correspondence. In the 
beginning of March, I reached out to her, and asked if I could conduct interviews with as many 
RME officials as possible during the same month. At that time, the first signs of what was later 
to be known as the Covid-19 pandemic started to emerge. The whole society started to shut 
down from the middle of March. Officials in both public and private companies were 
encouraged to work from home. In the midst of this, I received a negative reply from RME. 
The agency was unable to dedicate resources to my project in the circumstances of the 
pandemic.  
 
At this point I was at the crossroads. A decision had to be made if I should proceed with my 
current project or turn it into a desktop research by redefining problem definition, or should I 
look for the alternative agencies? I did not want to abandon my project altogether because I was 
convinced that I had a theoretically interesting and relevant research agenda. On the other hand, 
the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic made the alternative to research another agency less feasible. 
I saw it as very likely that other potential agencies had the same capacity problems as RME 
caused by the pandemic. When, in the end of March, the University announced that students 
whose research projects had been affected by Covid-19 could search extension for submission 
deadline, I used this opportunity to postpone my research. I hoped that once the situation 
stabilized, I would be able to conduct the interviews in RME. In the end of May I made my 
second attempt to get interviews in RME through my existing contact. My request was once 
again declined due to the same reason. I decided to ask for more help from my initial contact in 
NVE. After several weeks of email correspondence and calls, I finally got a reply from RME 
in the end August. They agreed to one interview.  
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I realized that the success of my project depended on my ability to get more RME officials into 
talk. Hence, I found a list over RME officials on the agency’s web page, identified to sections 
inside RME that, per my calculations, had greater concentration of officials embedded in the 
European networks (in this case, grid regulation and wholesale market sections), and engaged 
in cold calling. In this way, I was able to get two extra interviews. After these interviews were 
conducted and I was waiting for feedback from three more officials, I received email from RME 
management in which they asked me to cease all further enquiries regarding interviews. 
Officials who consented to participate in my research over the phone, were followed up by an 
email with detailed project information.  
 
Hence, the sample in this study consists of three RME officials. One of the officials works at 
the managerial level, and the remaining two officials work at the operative level. All of the 
interviewees were part of the Electricity Market Authority, one of the departments inside NVE. 
When the Electricity Market Authority was renamed and reorganized as a single regulatory 
authority - RME - they naturally became part of this unit. Interviewee 1 has started to work in 
the Electricity Market Authority department in 2013. This official occupies a managerial 
position and has a long experience from the energy sector. Interviewee 1 has many 
organizational tasks and sits in three groups – CEER, NordREG and ACER board of regulators. 
Interviewee 2 has been working in the Electricity Market Authority since 2007. This 
interviewee is an operational level official, with a background in engineering science. During 
the professional career in NVE/RME the interviewee 2 has had a variety of tasks and has 
worked a lot with the tasks that today’s RME has. The interviewee has also experience from 
collaboration in the European networks, in particular NordREG and CEER. As part of the 
Electricity Market Authority, the interviewee was involved in the preparatory work related to 
the transition to the Third Energy Market Package and ACER. Today, the interviewee mostly 
works with national regulations. Interviewee 3 has been working in NVE as part of the 
Electricity Market Authority department since 2015. This interviewee is an operational level 
official, and has a background in engineering science. Today, interviewee 3 mostly works 
within nation context, with regulatory development projects that run over several years.  
 
The sampling frame of three respondents can by no means be interpreted as sufficient to 
adequately confirm or refute validity of the theoretical propositions. In particular, this sample 
has one significant drawback, it lacks RME officials with active involvement in the European 
networks. Due to such bias in the sample, the conclusions made in this study regarding the 
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supranational role orientations must be taken with a bit of salt. I tried to mitigate the 
disadvantage of the small sample by focusing on the depth of coverage, whereby I tried to 
obtain more detailed accounts from each of my interview participants. I have also focused more 
on the documentary sources of information.   
 
3.2 Data Collection 
The primary sources of information in this research were interviews and documents. The use 
of several data collection methods can be beneficial from the methodological point of view as 
it allows to corroborate and cross check information. To answer my research questions, it was 
essential to get an intimate knowledge of how RME officials understand and interpret (make 
sense of) their world/day-to-day experiences. This made interviewing important data collection 
method. The interview is a well-suited technique to use when one is interested in studying 
opinions, attitudes and experiences (Tjora 2018). It draws heavily a phenomenological 
perspective where the purpose is to understand nuances in interviewee’s experiences and how 
they reflect over these experiences (Spradley 1979 in Tjora 2018).  
Documents, on the other hand, can be a good source of contextual information, they can provide 
rich information regarding the context within which objects of study operate. In the words of 
Bowen (2009:29) ‘bearing witness to past event, documents provide background information 
as well as a historical insight’. ‘Documents of all types can help the researcher to uncover 
meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem’ 
(Merriam 1988:118 in Bowen 2009:29). Methodologically, the use of documents has several 
strengths. First, documents are well-suited to in-depth analysis of framing process and 
strategies, that is the ways in which political actors define and construct issues, because 
‘documents contain extensive and systematically argued accounts of issues and because of the 
way they are understood by participants in the policy process’ (Lynggaard et al 2015:128).  
Second, documents can be used to reconstruct the historical evolution of events and agendas 
over long periods of time since documentary evidence usually extends back many years. 
Thirdly, unlike oral sources of information, documents represent preserved traces, which persist 
beyond the local context of their production. Documents ‘remain uniform across several and 
diverse local settings’ (Smith 1984:60 in Miller & Alvarado 2005:349), hence data from the 
documents can be considered to be more objective and less error-prone.  
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Hence, documents can be a good source of information regarding the context within which 
RME officials operate, their roles, duties and responsibilities. Interviews, on the other hand, 
can be instrumental for obtaining subjective reflections of those who hold and practice these 
roles. In other words, documents allow us to get ‘time images’ while interviews allow us to get 
personal experiences and reflections around these (Tjora 2018:190). 
 
3.2.1 Interviews 
Three (3) in-depth interviews with RME officials were conducted during September / October 
2020. The aim of each interview was to understand how each respondent perceives and defines 
his/hers role in the agency based on the individual experience. The format for the interview 
used was a semi-structured interview. The semi-structured interview technique allows 
advantages of conversational flow and depth of response (Aberbach and Rockman 2002).  
 
The interviews were conducted over the phone. Each interview, except for the first one that 
lasted for an hour, had a duration of approximate 45 minutes. It started with a little reiteration 
of the research aims and objectives. I chose to use open-ended questions in my interview to be 
able to capture ‘the depth and contextual nuance of response’, and, if necessary, to be able ‘to 
probe beneath the surface of a response to the reasoning and premises that underlie it’ 
(Aberback and Rockman 2002: 674). The questions were structured around two core themes. 
The first bulk of questions aimed at mapping respondents’ expertise, and activity and contact 
patterns. RME officials were asked a series of questions about their tasks, organizational 
position, previous professional and organizational experience, and degree of their involvement 
in the European network of energy regulators. The second bulk of questions aimed at mapping 
role perceptions of the RMEs officials. RME officials were asked questions about their role 
perceptions and if they experienced any role conflict. Notes were taken during the interview 
which were transcribed following each interview to minimize the loss of information.  
There are some methodological challenges connected to the use of interviews as data collection 
method. These includes both issues of validity and reliability. The valuable flexibility of open-
ended questions can exacerbate the validity and reliability issues (Berry 2002:679). In 
particular, lack on standardization of the stimulus in the interview situation can threaten 
reliability. On the other hand, the open-ended questions can also provide a greater opportunity 
for respondents to organize their answers within their own framework which ultimately 
increases the validity of the responses. 
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Another challenge with using interviews as data collection method is to get honest responses 
from the interviewees who can deliberately withhold or misrepresent information and 
interpretations (Bleek 1987). This is in particular relevant for civil servants in the higher-ranked 
positions who are trained in how to represent their organization to the outside world instead of 
providing their personal accounts of events (Mikecz 2012). It is also not uncommon that civil 
servants in higher-ranked positions can be ‘tempted to dominate the interview process’ or ‘get 
into monologues instead of answering difficult questions’ (Mikecz 2012:484). Indeed, in my 
first interview I experienced some loss of ‘control over the format and direction of the 
interview’ (Richards 1996:201). This happened because the interviewee in question was 
familiar with my questions as he has received the questionnaire in advance. Under 
circumstances of Covid-19, I have submitted my project outline and questionnaire to RME in 
hope that these could be answered in a written form. Even though the majority of questions on 
the list were covered by the interviewee, the interviewee remained in good control over the 
process and content. Occasionally I had to interrupt the interviewee to clarify things or asked 
additional questions that I felt was of particular importance to my research. In this situation it 
was important for me to retain critical judgment throughout the whole interview process but 
also later, when analyzing the data. Simultaneously, I tried to gain disposition of the respondent 
by being supportive of his argumentation and tried to answer all of his questions in a transparent 
and detailed way.  In the remaining two interviews I had a good control over the agenda, and I 
felt that the interviews went very well.  
 
3.2.2 Documents 
Documents were used as commentary to get rich information on the Energy Regulatory 
Authority and its context. Available organizational records and administrative documents were 
studied to get an insight into history, formal institutional design, and tasks and responsibilities 
of RME. Special attention was given to national legislative acts such as Energy Act (LOV-
2018-05-25-21), Prop 5L (2017-2018), Inst 175 L (2017-2018), ‘Regulation of grid operations 
and energy market’ (FOR-2019-10-24-1413), and 2020 letter of allocation. Internal documents 
providing information on internal dynamics inside RME (agendas, decision reports and/or 
guidelines, annual reports) available on the NVE/RME website were also assessed. Document 
‘Procedures for decision-making and interaction’ describes procedures that the RME should 
follow in its decision-making processes, and its interaction with other parts of NVE to ensure 
RME’s independence. 
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Moreover, the EU’s legislative acts, directives and regulations pertaining to the Third Energy 
Market Package and Internal Energy Market as such, were examined to get an insight into 
formal and normative rules regulating the relationships between RME and the EU-level actors. 
The following directives and regulations were of particular usefulness in this regard: Directive 
2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, 
Regulation No 713/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators, Regulation No 714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity. These directives and regulations allowed to build a 
comprehensive picture of the internal energy market rules and participation requirements. 
These documents establish distinctive norms, rules and role expectations for all actors (NRAs, 
ACER, Commission, TSOs) engaged in building the internal energy market. For instance, 
Directive 2009/72/EC outlines general objectives of the regulatory authorities, and their duties 
and powers. Regulation No 713/2009 establishes norms, rules, and role expectations for ACER 
officials while Regulation 714/2009 does the same for transmission system operators (TSO).  
There are some methodological challenges connected to the use of documents as data collection 
method. According to Bowen (2009:33) documents should not be treated as necessarily precise, 
accurate, or complete recordings of events that have occurred. Hence, when working with the 
official documents one should remember that most of these documents are of strategic nature 
and are deliberately produced for wide circulation.  
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
The data were analyzed through interpretation. Interpretation aims to make sense of the object 
of study by iterating between understanding of an object as a whole and understanding of its 
parts (Darke et al 1998:285). Analysis of data from the interviews and documents were framed 
by the theory/theoretical presuppositions presented in chapter 2. The goal of the analysis was 
to produce a comprehensive understanding of and explanation for the administrative behavior 
inside RME. This phenomenon was understood through accessing the meanings that 
participants assigned to them, placing particular focus on their cultural and historical context. 
The analysis of the interview data aimed to understand the administrative behavior as perceived 
and defined by RME officials themselves. Data from the documents were analyzed to put these 
perceptions in the context surrounding RME officials, and understand the dynamic interaction 
between RME officials and their context.  
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The qualitative interpretative method implies that the explanations of the phenomena will to 
some extent always be infused with researcher’s subjectivity. By attempting to understand, 
describe and interpret from the respondents’ perspective, a researcher will always in some or 
other way prejudice the findings. I embarked on this research with an open mind. I had my 
theory and expected to confirm the theory through the selected empirical case. Throughout the 
whole process, I tried to treat both the theoretical concepts that I used and the acquired empirical 
data impartially.  
 
3.4 Methodological Challenges and Mitigation  
Case-study research methodology is often criticized for being an inferior research method 
compared with other methods of scientific enquiry. According to Flyvbjerg (2006) the main 
criticism seems to revolve around issues of theory, reliability and validity.  
The conventional view of a case study research is that case study produces a type of context-
dependent knowledge which is considered to be inferior to a context-independent knowledge 
of the scientific research. However, as pointed out by Flyvbjerg (2006:221) ‘context-dependent 
knowledge and expertise lie at the very heart of expert activity’. The case study method provides 
intimate knowledge of different phenomena around us and thus taps into the fluid performance 
of tacit skills. In other words, case study is central to human learning. According to Flyvbjerg 
(2006:224) predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs 
because human beings change in time and space. 
Another standard view on a case study research is that one cannot generalize on the bases of a 
single case study. The assumption of ‘mutual influence among the many factors at work in any 
case discourages any attempt to reason about causes and effects or to generalize’ (Keating and 
Della Pond 2008:30). However, as Flyvbjerg (2006:226) notes ‘formal generalization is only 
one of many ways by which people gain and accumulate knowledge’. A purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in the 
collective process of knowledge accumulation. In-depth case study allows to collect a context-
dependent knowledge necessary to complement large-N statistical analyses.   
There are, however, also ways that allow to enhance the generalizability of a case study. For 
instance, the generalizability of a case study can be enhanced by strategic selection of case in 
relation to research objectives. The case for this study was selected because of its criticality. A 
critical case demonstrates that ‘if it happens here in will happen anywhere’ (Patton 1990:236 
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in Emmel 2014:). RME can be seen as a critical case or a ‘least likely’ case because of certain 
case characteristics. Firstly, as a new administrative body on a political-administrative scene, 
the agency has not yet managed to develop a distinct sense of purpose and a bureau-identity to 
accompany it in order to craft a distinct ‘space’ in the face of potential environmental threats to 
its existence (Eisenstadt 1959). Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the patterns of behaviour 
inside RME are still to a large extent in line with the national political and administrative 
cultures and beliefs. Moreover, the normative element of the Norwegian sector policy will most 
likely have a strong reinforcing effect on these patterns of behavior. Also, given the 
politicization of the energy sector due to its high importance for the Norwegian foreign policy, 
and security and defense policy it unlikely to expect that Norwegian political authorities will 
start to think and talk about energy in the exclusively economic terms. This will most likely 
make it more difficult for RME officials to develop any strong affiliation to the European level.  
Even though critical cases do not allow for broad generalizations, they can still be used for 
making theoretical or analytical generalizations. Referencing existing studies that support or 
reject empirical findings of the study (Trondal 2007:1121) can also contribute to empirical 
generalizations. Hence, the explanations of the administrative behavior as derived from this 
empirical research may be valuable in other settings and organizations.  
The last problem with the case study method is the issue of validity - how appropriate is the 
measuring instrument to the task at hand. The administrative behavior of RME is assessed on 
the basis of self-assessments or perceptions of individual actors working in the agency. This 
research draws inferences from individual observations to collective actors, from individual 
employee’s role perceptions to the administrative behavior of the agency. One has to 
acknowledge that connection between role perceptions and behavior is not always 
straightforward. In particular, in contexts where individuals carry multiple roles which can be 
in conflict with each other, role orientations may be deficient predictors of behavior. However, 
given the overall difficulty to study the objective behavior inside organizations, the subjective 
representations can still be valid source of information.   
The validity of findings can be enhanced by the use of more than one source of evidence. 
According to Yin (1995:92) the application of more than one source of evidence allows 
enhancing validity of finding by developing converging lines of enquiry, a process of 
triangulation. Triangulation allows mitigating potential problems of construct validity because 
multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon. Document 
analysis were used to supplement and contextualize data collected during the interviews. 
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Documents were instrumental for understanding the historical roots of the events and conditions 
that impinge on the role perceptions and administrative behavior. The combination of evidence 
from the interviews and documents allowed creating a comprehensive picture of RME agency, 
how it came into being, how it operates, and why it operates the way it does.     
It is worth mentioning some practical constrains experienced during this study. One of the main 
challenges was to gain access to the respondents. The problem of access to civil servants 
working in national administrations is a well-known problem in social sciences research. 
During the last years one can see a clear trend of declining response and participation rates in 
both quantitative and qualitative research (Bach et al 2020) while amount of research inquiries 
is constantly rising. In this particular case, the problem of access has been exacerbated by the 
Covid-19 pandemic at the time this research was conducted. The Covid-19 framed the 
possibilities for the overall research. By exacerbating capacity issues in all organizations, the 
Covid-19 pandemic has made access to RME agency difficult. It took a lot of time and effort 
to book an interview inside RME.  
In the retrospect, the problems of access might have been exacerbated by the internal 
circumstances of RME in the aftermath of a politicized reform. When I embarked on this 
research in autumn 2019, RME had just been designated as a single regulatory authority for 
electricity and gas. The process of incorporation of the Third Energy Market Package and   
designation of the RME as a result of the pressures from the EU have been very politicized. 
Organizations that have recently undergone a politicized reform may be vulnerable and 
unwilling to collaborate with researchers. Undoubtedly, RME bears the marks of this process 
in some way or another.  
My experience with searching RME officials for interviews indicates that capacity constraint 
was not the biggest issue for RME at the time. Indeed, when I personally called to RME 
officials, and asked them to participate in my research, I experienced that all four of them were 
interested and willing to contribute 45 minutes of their time to support my project. Moreover, 
with the submission extension, there was plenty of time to participate in the research. The 
resistance to my research seems to originate at the management level. I am convinced I would 




3.5 Ethical Issues 
In qualitative research, it is important to explore the ethical consequences of collecting personal 
experiences and opening those experiences to public scrutiny. The study followed the 
recognized guidelines for ethical principles and norms for research as recommended by the 
National Research Ethics Committee for the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH).  
 
One of the most important ethical consideration in this study was to maintain the integrity of 
the interviewees both during the interview and afterwards, during interpretation and 
presentation of the results. Hence, sensitive information was treated with caution and all 
personal information such as name and title were anonymized. Project details were distributed 
to each interviewee and their consent was obtained prior each interview. Interviewees were also 







CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
In this chapter results from the empirical research are presented. I start the chapter with a short 
introduction to both the Norwegian and EUs energy sector governance models. Introduction to 
RME, in particular its organization, duties and competencies, and operational environment are 
presented in section 4.3.1.1.  
 
4.1 Norwegian Energy Sector Governance 
Norwegian energy policy has a long tradition of strong public governance (Austvik and Claes 
2011). The development of the electricity sector (since early 1900s) and, later the petroleum 
sector (since 1970s) has been ‘largely controlled by the state through public companies and 
strong regulations to ensure that employment, skills and value creation would come for the 
good of the whole nation’ (Austvik and Claes 2011:7). The comprehensive concession law 
system, ratified in 1917, ‘institutionalized national and community control over the national 
resources, and locked it in as the fundamental sector governance system’ (Olsen 2000:89). The 
concession system makes it necessary to purchase a concession (license) from the state in order 
to engage in any activity related to utilization of the natural resources. Depending on the sector, 
the concessions are usually issued for a period of 10-60 years. At the expiry of the concession 
period all industrial installations have to be returned to the state without compensation. The 
concession system with associated reversion to the state through escheat (Hjemfallsvilkår) 
contributes to the restructuring of ownership in the Norwegian energy generation. The 
Norwegian state plays the dominant role in energy production and transmission system. 
Norwegian municipalities, county municipalities and state together own about 90 per cent of 
the electricity production capacity in the country2. The state, through Statkraft SF and Statnett 
SF3, owns about 35 per cent of the electricity production capacity, and about 98 per cent of the 
electricity transmission network. When it comes to production and transmission system for 
natural gas, the state owns 51 per cent4 of natural gas transmission network through its 
                                               
2 https://energifaktanorge.no/om-energisektoren/eierskap-i-kraftsektoren/ 
3 Statnett SF, a state-owned company, is a transmission system operator for electricity. It owns, develops and 
operates 11 000 km long transmission grid that connects producers with consumers throughout the country. Its 
responsibilities include ensuring sufficient capacity in the grid, and balancing of power in the grid by coordinating 
production and consumption. As a transmission system operator, Statnett SF is responsible for coordinating the 
operation of the power supply system, dealing with congestion and facilitating international electricity trade, and 




ownership of Gassco AS - transmission system operator for natural gas, and 70 per cent of the 
production capacity through its partly ownership (67 per cent of the shares) of Equinor ASA.   
Since 1990s the framework for the organization of the energy sector in Norway has been 
provided by the Energy Act (LOV-1990-06-29-50). The Energy Act facilitates competition in 
energy production and wholesale and regulates sector activity through various licensing 
schemes, including construction and operation of electrical systems, district heating systems, 
power sales and monopoly control, foreign trade in power, metering, billing and invoicing, 
marketplace for physical power sales, system responsibility, rationing, delivery quality, energy 
planning, and power supply readiness (Austvik and Claes 2011). 
 
The political framework and/or national policy goals for management of energy resources in 
Norway are set by the Parliament (Storting). The Government performs its executive authority 
with the help of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MEP) which has the overall 
responsibility for the management of energy resources in Norway. It is the Ministry’s task to 
ensure that the resource management is carried out in accordance with the guidelines provided 
by the Parliament, and the Government. Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Agency 
(NVE) is managing national energy resources on behalf of the Ministry. 
 
4.1.1 Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Agency (NVE) 
NVE is a professional agency subordinated to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. NVEs 
history can be traced back to 1847 when an early ministerial office ‘Canal-Directionen’ was 
reorganized into a separate agency ‘Kanalvesenet’. This institution became instrumental for ‘a 
massive state development of hydropower to provide cheap energy for development of large-
scale energy intensive industry sector, in particular the chemical and metallurgical industries’ 
(Olsen 2002). NVE, as we know it today, was established in may 1921 when the ‘Electricity 
Commission’, the ‘Waterway Commission’, and the agency ‘Vassdragsvesenet’ were merged 
together in one agency. This merger aimed to simplify the complex administration of the energy 
sector that existed prior 1921. The agency has headquarters in Oslo, Norway, and five regional 
offices: Region North in Narvik, Region Central Norway in Trondheim, Region West in Førde, 
Region South in Tønsberg and Region East in Hamar. 
 
The distribution of responsibilities and tasks between NVE and the MEP is laid down in several 
laws and regulations. As a professional agency, NVE has a central role in performing technical 
studies and assessments and providing advice to the Ministry, monitoring energy and power 
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supply, making decisions and managing installations related to the energy and power system. 
NVE’s mandate is to ensure an integrated and environmentally sound management of the 
national water resources, promote efficient energy markets and cost-effective energy systems, 
and contribute to efficient energy use. The agency plays a central role in the national flood 
contingency planning and has overall responsibility for maintaining national energy supply. It 
is heavily involved in research and development, and plays important role in national and 
international climate research. NVE is a national center for expertise in hydrology.  
 
Since the Energy Act entered into force in January 1991, NVE has been functioning in the 
regulatory role for the electricity sector. NVE’s tasks and competencies in this area are subject 
to the Energy Act regulations and/or individual delegation decisions from the Ministry. NVE 
supervises 23 different subject areas within watercourses, energy supply and energy labeling / 
energy use. In particular, NVE has been monitoring compliance with rules and standards in two 
important areas of the energy system - the network security and reliability (system 
responsibility) and quality of service and supply (quality of supply). The agency has also been 
delegated competence to make and change regulations pertaining to these areas. In particular, 
NVE developed and issued regulations for network regulation and tariffs, metering and 
settlement, billing, supplier switching, financial and technical reporting, neutrality and non-
discrimination and, and obligations of the transmission system operators (TSO).  
 
The Ministry governs NVE through annual letters of allocation. In these the Ministry specifies 
goals, priorities and management parameters for NVE operations. The Ministry also functions 
as an appellate body for the regulatory decisions made by the NVE. In particular, the Ministry 
can perform a judicial review of NVE’s decisions, and add guidelines/instructions on how these 
regulations shall be enforced.  
 
NVE’s operations are organized in six departments: Energy Systems, Licensing, Supervision 
and Contingency Planning, Hydrology, Avalanche, Landslides, Flood and River Management, 
and Electricity Market Authority. Each of these departments is responsible for its own task 
portfolio and is managed by a director who reports to NVE’s director general. The supervisory 
tasks are concentrated in three of these departments: Energy Systems, Supervision and 
Contingency Planning, and the Electricity Market Authority. In NVE, the supervisory tasks are 




Figure 1: Norwegian Sector Governance 
 
4.2 Energy Sector Governance in Europe  
Energy policy is an important area of cooperation for the European Union. Article 194 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of European Union provides legal basis for the competencies of EU 
in the field of energy. According to Article 194 TFEU, the main aims of the EU’s energy policy 
are to (1) ensure the functioning of the energy market, (2) ensure security of energy supply in 
the Union, (3) promote energy efficacy and energy saving, (4) the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy, and (5) promote the interconnection of energy networks. To 
complete construction of the integrated energy market, EU is working hard at unifying the 
diversity of national regulations through harmonization (Scharpf 1994) and producing market 
liberalization directives and regulations. Between 1996 and 2016 EU has adopted four 
consecutive legislative packages (First Energy Market Package 1996, Second Energy Market 
Package 2003, Third Energy Market Package 2009, and Fourth Energy Market Package 2019) 
to address market access, transparency and regulation, consumer protection, independence of 
regulatory authorities, supporting interconnection, energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
security of electricity supply and governance rules for the Energy union5. These packages 
include EC directives and regulations attempting to regulate all matters of internal energy 
market in the most comprehensive fashion possible and down to smallest detail.  
 
Starting with the Third Energy Package, the development of the internal energy market in 
Europe has been enabled by the so-called network codes. A network code is a set of technical 
rules addressing specific problems of market integration and operation. One important feature 




of network codes is that they are very detailed. Hence, once they are developed and accepted 
by the Commission they allow less flexibility in the implementation phase than, for example, a 
guideline. To date four gas network codes and 8 electricity network codes6 are adopted. The 
preparation of network codes involves the European Commission, ACER, and the European 
Network of System Operator of Electricity/Gas (ENTSO-E/G). Each year, the Commission 
identifies areas for network code development. Following the Commission’s request, ACER 
prepares the framework guidelines/key principles for the development of the network codes. 
Based on these guidelines ENTSO should prepare a draft of the code within the period of 12 
months and submits it to ACER for review. ACER reviews/amends drafted network codes 
prepared by ENTSO, and sends these to the Commission with a recommendation for adoption. 
The draft becomes a network code once it gets approved by a committee composed of national 
experts through the comitology procedure. The whole process of drafting and approval stage 
shall be performed within the 3-year work plan agreed between ENTSO-E/G, ACER and the 
EC. During the drafting process a number of workshops / informal consultations may be held 
with stakeholders and NRAs, with more formal consultations usually held once the draft 
proposal of the network code is available and approved. Network codes are usually approved 
as Commission regulations, which means that they are legally binding and come into force 20 
days after publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.  
 
To achieve its objectives and complete the internal energy market, EU relies on the trans-
European energy network. This network represents cooperation between several institutional 
actors, like National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) taking place within a Community structure coordinated by EU Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)7. This network aims to pool administrative 
resources through intensive horizontal and vertical interaction and knowledge sharing between 
EU-level and subnational actors and intra-network task specialization (Veslund 2017:62).  
 
                                               
6 Four (4) of these are guidelines (Terms and Conditions or Methodologies). 
7 The adoption of the Fourth Energy Package, Clean Energy Package, changes existing process of development of 
network codes and guidelines. The strong role of ENTSOs in the drafting of network codes is reduced and 
substituted by stronger presence of Distribution System Operators (DSO). The role of ACER in development phase 
is expected to increase. The adoption process for both new network codes and guidelines is also changed. ACER 
now directly decides on the methodologies with a pan-European scale (former ‘all NRA’ decisions). Regarding 
network codes and guidelines, the Clean Energy Package distinguishes between the adoption of network codes 
and guidelines as implementing or delegated acts. Depending on the type of act, the European institutions and 
stakeholders have different rights and possibilities to intervene in the adoption process. 
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4.2.1 National Regulatory Authorities 
A requirement for Member States to establish regulators with specific competencies was 
introduced by the Second Energy Market Package (ref. Directive 2003/54/EC). From the 
directive it followed that: 
‘The Member States should cooperate closely, eliminating obstacles to cross- 
border exchanges of electricity and natural gas with a view to achieving 
the objectives of Community energy policy’ 
The Third Energy Market Package (2009) expanded NRAs duties and ‘obliged Member States 
to enact measures that would guarantee NRAs the ability to carry out their regulatory functions 
effectively’ (Fresa 2015). EUs directives establish distinctive roles for NRAs, and ensure that 
they remain free from the instruction of their respective governments. From Directive 
2009/72/EC follows that:  
‘Energy regulators need to be able to take decisions in relation to all relevant regulatory 
issues if the internal market in electricity to function properly, and to be fully independent 
from any other public or private interests. This precludes neither judicial review nor 
parliamentary supervision in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Member States’ 
The NRAs are granted a general competence, and the resulting obligation, as regards ensuring 
general compliance with European Union law, as well as compliance with and implementation 
of legally binding decisions of ACER and of the Commission. The objectives of the regulatory 
authorities, their duties and powers are outlined in Article 36 (general objectives) and 37 (core 
duties) of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 40 (general objectives) and 41 (core 
duties) of the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. These articles are complementary, hence while 
performing their core competencies and duties NRAs must also ‘take all reasonable measures 
to implement the list of objectives’8 assigned to them. In particular, the NRAs core monitoring 
duties include (1) monitoring of tariffs for access to national transmission or distribution 
networks; (2) monitoring of the competition, market transparency and unbundling 
requirements; (3) monitoring compliance of transmission and distribution system operators 
with their obligations under the directives; (4) monitoring and assessment of investment plans 
of the TSOs; (5) monitoring of compliance with and reviewing the past performance of network 
                                               
8 Commission Staff Working Paper of 22 January 2010: Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning 
Common Rules for the Internal Markets in natural Gas, p.12. 
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security and reliability rules and setting or approving standards and requirements for quality of 
service and supply; (6) monitoring of the consumer protection measures. 
Moreover, there are three core areas where NRAs shall be able to pre-regulate. NRAs shall be 
able to fix or approve sufficiently in advance the methodologies used to calculate or establish 
the terms and conditions for: 
1) connection and access to national networks, including transmission and distribution 
tariffs or their methodologies 
2) the provision of balancing services  
3) access to cross-border infrastructure including the procedure for the allocation of 
capacity and congestion management. 
These terms and conditions (methodologies) are developed by the transmission system 
operators, and approved by NRAs. The pan-European methodologies require approval by all 
NRAs while regional/national methodologies require approval from NRAs of the involved 
countries.  
Furthermore, the directive mandates Member States to grant NRAs powers to make binding 
decisions on electricity undertakings, authority to carry out investigations into the functioning 
of the electricity markets, authority to ask electricity undertakings to disclose any information 
relevant for the fulfilment of their tasks, and powers to impose effective and proportionate 
penalties on electricity undertakings not complying with their obligations under the directive. 
Most NRAs cooperate and exchange information through the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) cooperation platform. CEER is a Belgian non-for-profit association 
established in 2003. CEER advises and assists the European institutions on regulatory issues, 
prepare the implementing measures, foster and review common and uniform day to day 
implementation and application of EU legislation.  
4.2.2 Transmission System Operators  
Other important actors within the European energy governance structure are Transmission 
System Operators (TSO). TSOs are responsible for the wholesale transfer of electricity or 
natural gas from the point of production to the point of distribution.  
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TSOs operate within their own networks, the European Network for Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and the European Network for Transmission System 
Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G). Both networks were established in 2009 by the EUs Third 
Energy Market Package ‘in order to ensure optimal management of the electricity / natural gas 
transmission network and to allow trading and supplying electricity and gas across boarders in 
the Community’, and are coordinated by EU agency ACER. ENTSO-E consists of 42 
transmission system operators (TSO) from 32 countries across Europe. Some countries have 
several certified TSOs while Norway has only one - Statnett SF.  ENTSO-G consists of 44 
members, 3 associated partners, and 9 observers (including Norwegian Gassco AS). To become 
a TSO, a company has to be certified by the NRA under close supervision from the 
Commission.  
ENTSO-E/G tasks and responsibilities include development of network codes and guidelines, 
cross-border infrastructure planning, coordination of grid operation through information 
exchange, and preparation of forecasts for electricity/gas generation, and supply and demand. 
ENTSO-E/G shall also monitor and analyze the implementation of network codes and their 
impact on the market integration process.  
4.2.3 Agency for the Cooperation of European Energy Regulators (ACER)  
ACER agency was established under the Third Energy Market Package9 to fill in the regulatory 
gap at Community level, and to contribute towards the effective functioning of internal markets 
of electricity and natural gas. Its powers and tasks are enshrined in EU laws adopted by the 
Member States and the European Parliament. From ACER’s foundational Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 it follows: 
‘The Agency should ensure that regulatory functions performed by the national regulatory 
authorities in accordance with Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas are properly coordinated 
and, where necessary, completed at the Community level’. 
                                               
9 Ref. Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators of 13 July 2009. 
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Thus, ACERs main role is to ensure regulatory harmonized implementation of EU energy 
policy across member and affiliated states through surveillance and coordination of National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and transmission system operators (TSOs) engaged through 
ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G networks. In cooperation with the Commission, ACER shall monitor 
that these actors exercise their functions in accordance with the Electricity and Gas Market 
Directives. ACER have an advisory role vis-à-vis the Commission, the Council and Parliament 
in the development of the internal energy market regulations in Europe. The agency also acts 
in advisory role and issue recommendations to NRAs on the correct application of EU 
regulations in specific cases.  
 
Over the years, ACERs competencies have been gradually strengthened by the EU Commission 
in order to make the agency more capable to tackle problems arising from fragmented 
regional/cross-border oversight, and associated risk of divergent decisions and unnecessary 
delays. In addition to coordination and surveillance functions, ACER has got a key role to play 
in the development of new regulations in the form of network codes and has been granted 
decision-making authority in those areas where fragmented national decisions of cross-border 
relevance are likely to lead to problems for the internal energy market. In particular, ACER can 
make binding decisions in the event of disagreement between the national regulatory authorities 
concerned or if they jointly request such decision. ACER’s decisions have to be approved by 
the board of regulators which adopts decisions by a two-thirds majority. Today, ACER’s 
decision-making authority covers technical issues of cooperation between NRAs (pursuant to 
Article 7 of the Regulation 713/2009/EC), terms and conditions for access to and operational 
security of cross-border infrastructure (Article 8 of the Regulation 713/2009/EC) or 
disagreement over the processing of applications for regulatory exemptions for new foreign 
connections (Article 9 of the Regulation 713/2009/EC). At the request from the Commission, 
ACER can develop a network code in line with the framework guidelines when ENTSO-E/G 
fails to develop a network code through the comitology procedure within 12 months period. 
ACER agency has its own administration and management. It comprises an administrative 
board, a board of regulators, a director and a board of appeal. ACER’s administrative board 
consists of nine representatives from the member states, two members of which are appointed 
by the Commission, two members are appointed by the European Parliament, and five members 
are appointed by the Council on a rotation basis. The board of regulators comprises senior 
representatives of the regulatory authorities, and one non-voting representative from the 
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Commission. The director is appointed for five years period by the administrative board from 
a list of candidates proposed by the Commission. The Board of Appeal is part of ACER but it 
is independent from its administrative and regulatory structure. It comprises six members 
selected from current or former senior staff of the national regulatory authorities, competition 
authorities, or other national or Community institutions. 
At the operational level, the Agency is divided into five departments (Corporate Services, 
Electricity, Gas, Market Surveillance and Conduct, Market Integrity and Transparency), and 
four horizontal clusters (Brussels Liaison Office, Legal Services, Operational IT/Security, Data 
Excellence) which have a central role in providing key support functions to the whole Agency 
in fulfilling its mandate, objectives and goals. A large part of the technical work in ACER is 
carried out in working groups. There are currently free working groups (Monitoring, Integrity 
and Transparency, Electricity, and Gas) in ACER. These groups bring together representatives 
of ACER, national regulators and the European Commission. The ACER working groups’ 
chairs and vice-chairs are senior representatives of national regulatory authorities. 
4.3 Norwegian - EU Energy Cooperation 
Norway’s and EUs energy sector policy models meet through the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA Agreement) both when it comes to policy form and process (Austvik and 
Claes 2011). The institutional framework of the EEA consists of two pillars and is often referred 
to as the ‘two-pillar structure’. The EU and its institutions constitute one pillar (EU bodies), 
while the EEA EFTA States10 and their institutions constitute the other pillar (EEA EFTA 
bodies), mirroring those of the EU11. No EUs directives and regulations have direct legal effect 
in Norway until these are accepted by the EEA Joint Committee and incorporated into the EEA 
Agreement. However, as no legislative powers are transferred to EEA Joint Committee from 
the contracting parties, the decisions made by the EEA Joint Committee can only be binding 
after they have been approved by parliament of each state subject to the agreement.  
 
The amendment of the existing national law or adoption of a new law due to the incorporation 
of the EEA/EU acts requires parliamentary approval. Between 1991 and 2020 the Government 
has submitted 28912 propositions regarding EU legal acts to the Storting. To comparison, more 
                                               





than 11,00013 EU legal acts (directives and regulations) have been incorporated into the EEA 
Agreement and transposed into the Norwegian law since the agreement entered into force in 
1994. This gap indicates that most of the EU legal acts are transposed into the Norwegian law 
through amendment and/or adaptation of the existing law to EU regulations. Norway also 
surpasses many member states in terms of its transposition efficiency. In 2019, Norwegian 
transposition deficit score was 0.3% compared to the EU average of 0.6%14, which means that 
of 23 Single Market-related directives Norway has transposed the majority of these within the 
shortest timeframe. Conformity deficit was rated to 0% which gave Norway an overall stable 
result and perfect score.  
 
Current practice of incorporation of the EU legislation has received several criticisms. For 
instance, Jevnaker (2019) claims that current practice has some obvious disadvantages as it 
contributes to late political anchoring for the EU legislation that is to be incorporated in 
Norway, depriving national political actors to influence the outcome of the legislation in any 
way. In 71 % of the cases, the Parliament was presented with a piece of final EU legislation for 
approval/disapproval in the aftermath of both the EU process and EEA process (Jevnaker 2019). 
 
4.3.1 New Sector Governance Model in Norway 
The incorporation of EU’s energy market packages into the EEA Agreement (1996, 2005, 2017) 
has changed resource management, licensing policy and market conditions in the Norwegian 
energy sector (Austvik and Claes 2011). What started as a simple, yet ambitious, market 
liberalization project has over the years evolved into a more comprehensive energy market 
policy. The Third Energy Market Package directives supplement the competition policy with 
both ‘infrastructure packages and political relations with transit and producer countries’ 
(Austvik and Claes 2011:17), demonstrating a great agreement within EU that more and 
different type of policy than just the increased competition policy is needed to develop a more 
mature internal energy market.   
 
As a result of the incorporation of the directives and regulations of the EU’s Third Energy 
Market Package into the Norwegian law, two new legal bodies had to be introduced in the 
traditional sector governance model. The European law mandated introduction of a single 




regulatory authority with legal distinction and functional independence from the national 
government, and any other public body. This single national regulatory authority had to be 
entrusted with all regulatory duties as outlined in the directives and regulations of the Third 
Energy Market Package. The Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority (RME) was designated 
by the MEP as a single national regulatory authority for the electricity and gas market in 
November 2019.  
 
Concomitantly, the Energy Appeals Board was established to deal with complaints on the 
individual decisions made by RME. Hence, the Ministry’s role as an appellate body for NVE’s 
regulatory decisions will not be applicable for regulatory decisions made by RME. The board 
consists of 5 members and is located in Bergen. The members of the Energy Board of Appeal 
are appointed by the Ministry, however by law they are ensured the right to independent and 
instruction-free operation. 
 
Figure 2: New Sector Governance Model. 
 
4.3.1.1 Energy Regulatory Authority (RME) 
RME was established in November 2019 following the implementation of the Third Energy 
Market Package into the Norwegian law. Its legal statues can be found in § 2-3 of the Energy 
Act and § 4 of the Natural Gas Act, cf. the Natural Gas Regulation § 1- 4. The role and 
competencies of RME are formalized and specified in the FOR-2019-10-24-1413 ‘Regulation 
of grid operations and energy market’ (NEM)15. The main statutory objective of RME is to: 
 
‘promote social and economic development through efficient and 
environmentally sound energy production, and efficient and reliable 
transmission, distribution, trade and use of energy.’16 
                                               




The RME agency has been entrusted with duties related to the monitoring and regulation of the 
electricity and gas markets. Its main role is to ensure competitive, non-discriminatory and 
efficient functioning of electricity and gas markets by monitoring market players’ compliance 
with obligations arising not only from the national legislation but also from the EU legislation, 
in particular the directives and regulations of the Third Energy Market Package. Some of the 
important tasks in this regard are to ensure that there are no cross-subsidies between 
transmission distribution and supply activities in the market, and monitoring of the competition, 
market transparency and unbundling requirements.  
  
To perform its duties under the directives, RME has been granted some individual decision-
making competencies. In particular, RME can make binding decisions in individual cases when 
it comes to: supply obligation terms of license holding companies (§3-1); connection and access 
for new consumers/producers to national networks (§3-2; 3-3); incomes from the sale of 
electrical energy (§4-5); terms of access to cross-border connections (§4-11); terms for 
organization and operation of wholesale market (§4-9); terms and conditions for TSO’s system 
responsibility (§6-1) and certification of transmission systems operators (§7-1). Moreover, 
RME can impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties on electricity undertakings 
which fail to comply with their obligations (§8-3). RME does not have authority to grant 
international concessions but it can establish and/or approve agreements, terms or methods for 
connections within the framework of the concession terms stipulated by the Ministry. Decisions 
made by RME can only be appealed to the Energy Board of Appeal. Neither government nor 
the Ministry can review, suspend or veto RME decisions.  
 
While RME has been granted some individual decision-making competencies, its competences 
(or the competences that the Electricity Market Authority had) to make regulations were to a 
large extent withdrawn. In practice, there is only one area where RME can make (issue) 
regulations. In particular, RME can fix or approve the methodologies or the terms and 
conditions underlying the calculation of the tariffs (as stated in §8-5, NEM).  
Other tasks that follow from the directive include compliance with and implementation of 
legally binding decisions from ACER and/or the Commission. In dispute cases where ACER 
had to approve terms and conditions/methodologies for either the connection and access to 
national networks, provision of balancing services, and/or access to cross-border infrastructure, 
the European Surveillance Authority (ESA) shall make a corresponding decision under the 
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provisions of the EEA Agreement. The ESA’s decisions are directed to RME for national 
implementation.  
 
RME participates in the European network of energy regulators coordinated by Agency for the 
Cooperation of European Energy Regulators (ACER). In fact, RME has a legally binding 
obligation17 to closely cooperate and disclose information with other NRAs and ACER, in 
particular on the cross-border issues. RME participate fully in ACER’s regulatory board, the 
administrative board, and the preparatory bodies such as working groups and committees. 
When participating in these bodies, RME does not have a right to vote. As a national regulator, 
RME has the obligation to report to Member States and ACER, and supply them with market 
information on production, transmission and consumption. RME prepares an annual report to 
the Ministry, the ACER and the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) on its activities and 
fulfilment of its duties under Article 37 of the Directive 2009/72/EC. RME is also active in the 
CEER and NordREG networking platforms. At the national level, RME collaborates with other 
authorities in the energy market, in particular the Norwegian Competition Authority 
(Konkuransetilsynet), the Finance Authority (Finanstilsynet) and the Consumer Authority 
(Forbrukertilsynet). 
 
Amidst its responsibilities under the directives, RME also acts in an advisory role to the 
Ministry at the national level.  
 
‘The regulatory authority should be able to assist the department with  
professional expertise. For example, it may be a matter of evaluating proposals for regulatory 
changes, which are later adopted by the Ministry. RME should also be able to propose 
changes to the Ministry on its own initiative’ (Prop. 5 L 2017–2018:20).  
 
To perform its advisory role, RME shall have a good overview of the developments in the 
European energy system, the development of policy and regulations in the EU, and how these 
affect Norway; it shall assist the Ministry in assessing EU regulations, provide professional 
advice, and prepare suggestions for change of national regulations. 
 
                                               
17 Prop. 4 S (2017–2018). 
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4.3.1.1.1 Formal Organization  
RME is organized as a state administrative body and its activity falls under the Public 
Administration Act. Today, RME is organized as a separate unit within NVE (See figure 3). Its 
predecessor, the Electricity Market Authority, was established within NVE in January 2013 to 
engage with the regulatory tasks that would follow from the incorporation of the EUs Third 
Energy Market Package18 into the EEA Agreement and the Norwegian law. In January 2018, 
the Electricity Market Authority was renamed into the Norwegian Energy Regulatory Authority 
(RME). Upon designation of RME as the regulatory authority in November 2019, it started to 
operate as a separate unit with legal distinction and functional independence from NVE. All 
tasks related to market regulation and monitoring under the directives and regulations of the 














To secure continuation of the current practice of the sector governance, whereby the Ministry 
remains in control over the security and quality of supply issues, and overall development and 
maintenance of the energy system, the Ministry and the Norwegian Parliament chose not to 
entrust monitoring of the system security issues to RME. Hence, the monitoring of matters of 
importance for the operation and development of the national energy system, including the 
balance of supply and demand on the national market, the level of expected future demand and 
                                               
18 Ref. Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity  
Ref. Energy Act, Regulation 714/2009 on cross-border power trading and Regulation 713/2009 on the Agency 
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Figure 3: Monitoring responsibilities 
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additional capacity being planned or under construction, the quality and level of maintenance 
of the networks, and the measures to cover peak demand and to remedy the loss of power supply 
remained in the NVE. The award of licenses for watercourse and energy facilities, and 
monitoring of watercourse facilities, floods and landslides also falls under NVEs 
responsibilities. 
 
To ensure functional independence of RME in carrying out its regulatory tasks independently 
from NVE, the internal collaboration and information exchange routines have been formalized.  
In particular, internal rules and procedures specify internal case processing routines, and 
interaction and coordination patterns between RME and NVE officials to ensure independent 
case processing. These also dictate that RMEs officials cannot engage in other and/or parallel 
activities inside NVE. The RME shall have competence to carry out its tasks and fulfill the 
responsibilities emanating from the Third Energy Market Package independently.  
 
RME has also been allocated individual financial resources. The Ministry issues a separate 
annual letter of allocation to RME which is approved by the Parliament. The allocation letter 
sets agency’s financial framework, specifies goals for the next year, and indicates the reporting 
requirements and deadlines. In 2020 RME has been allocated a budget of 5.3M euro.  
 
Internally, RME is organized in five sections: (1) network regulation, (2) wholesale market, (3) 
retail market, (4) economic regulation, and (5) energy market law, where each section handles 
individual task portfolio/focus area.  
 
Figure 4: Internal organization of RME department 
 
For instance, the wholesale market section is responsible for following the integration of system 
operations and market, and monitoring of the regulations in this area. The sections’ activities 
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include measurement and calculation of electrical energy, issuance of sales licenses, monitoring 
of organizational development in the industry and enforcement of rules for market behavior. 
This section is actively involved in the Nordic and European cooperation. The section for 
economic regulation regulates grid companies’ revenues, license holder duties, and consumer 
compensation claims. The section controls technical and financial data from the license holders, 
monitors grid companies to prevent cross-subsidization and ensures that correct data is 
collected for revenue regulation. It is involved in the development of network codes and 
methodologies in connection with its activities devoted to cost-effectiveness of the grid 
companies and revenue regulations.  
 
The section for network regulation regulates grid operations (electricity transmission and 
distribution) in accordance with the provisions of the Norwegian legislation, in particular the 
Energy Act and associated regulations. This include grid tariffs of network services and 
conditions for network connection of production and consumption. The section is also 
responsible for monitoring compliance with regulations on quality of supply and system 
responsibility, including monitoring of Statnett’s exercise of system responsibility. It is 
responsible for processing complaints about tariffs, quality of supply and system responsibility, 
as well as further development of the regulations in these areas. The section includes work on 
collecting and publishing grid tariffs for the country’s grid companies, preparation of annual 
power interruption statistics, and an annual report on the operation of the power system. The 
section conducts inspections of the grid companies. 
 
Each section is managed by a section manager whose main responsibility is to manage section’s 
task portfolio and staff, and represent the section in the management meeting. RME is managed 
by a director and a management board, which consists of managers for each of the five sections. 
This suggests the unity of command structure where the chain of command goes from the 
director, through the section managers down to each official at the bottom level. RME’s director 
and members of the managements board are appointed for a fixed term of five to seven years 
which can be renewed once. As RME is still part of the larger NVE organization, RME director 
has a reporting line to the director-general of the NVE.  Currently there are 63 officials within 
RME with various backgrounds in law, economy, and engineering science. These officials 
cannot work in other parts of NVE while holding a position in RME.  
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RME shares premises with NVE’s head office in Oslo. When deciding on RME’s location, both 
the Ministry and NVE agreed that co-location of RME and NVE would be beneficial as it would 
allow to keep professional environment and minimize competence-related challenges. This 
decision may have some connection with the assessment made NVE upon request from the 
Ministry in 2017. In 2017, the Ministry asked NVE to perform an assessment of the possibility 
to relocate the regulatory tasks in the NVE from its head office in Oslo to several regional 
offices. The internal assessment made by NVE at that time revealed that the relocation of tasks 
performed by the Electricity Market Authority to a regional office would not beneficial as the 
regulatory tasks performed by this department formed an integral part of the agency’s overall 
management tasks. As the tasks performed by the Electricity Market Authority ranged 
professionally very widely, from socio-economic assessments related to electricity exchange 
and system operation, control of grid companies and market monitoring, to technical 
assessments of quality of supply in the low voltage grid, it was necessary to keep the monitoring 
tasks performed by this department together with the tasks pertaining to overall sector 
development. 
 
The new sector governance model, as described above, builds on one important assumption that 
the Ministry can still exercise political control over the sector through general sector policy 
framework. From the Prop. 5 L (2017-2018) it follows that: 
 
 ‘The Ministry does not consider the directive to prevent the authorities from 
 providing general guidelines regarding political objectives, cf. Article 35 no. 4 (b). It also  
appears in the Commission’s interpretation note to the Third Electricity Market Directive of 
22 January 2010 that the Government’s task is to prepare the political framework. Security of 
supply, renewable energy and energy efficiency are mentioned as examples in this connection. 
The Ministry does not consider the room for maneuver to issue general guidelines based on 
the political objectives to be limited to only these areas’ (ibid.,20). 
… 
‘The regulatory authority operation shall not be cut off from other social institutions 
 and interests. The regulatory authority shall comply with current political 
 guidelines and regulations’ (ibid.,20). 
 
This assumption may be correct; however, it may also represent a ‘one-sided Norwegian 
interpretation of the directives’ (‘Nei til EU’ in Prop. 5 L 2017-2018:19). Indeed, even though 
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the directives do not directly deprive the government the possibility to determine the policy 
framework within which NRA must operate, they expect that these general policy guidelines 
are consistent with the European Union law. As indicated in the Commission Staff Working 
Paper (2010:6): ‘The NRA will have to be created in accordance with the constitutional and 
administrative rules of each Member State insofar as they are consistent with European Union 
law’. The establishment of ACER at the EU level and the NRAs for enforcement of EU 
legislature in each member- and affiliated state cements EU’s commitment to internal energy 
market project. From the perspective of EU, the NRAs shall promote a competitive, secure and 
environmentally sustainable internal market for electricity and gas in the Community. Hence, it 
is reasonable to assume that EU institutions will do everything in their power to ensure that 
NRAs are both organized and operate in accordance with their European mandate. Indeed, the 
way RME is organized has already attracted scrutiny from the European level. In its letter to 
the Ministry of 16 October 2020, EFTA Surveillance Authority19 (ESA) asked the Ministry to 
provide a complete account for how the independence, impartiality and transparency of the 
Energy Regulatory Authority had been ensured in practice, given RME’s current organization 
inside NVE and administrative subjugation to the Ministry. The ESA also asked the Ministry 
to justify how current allocation of competences between RME, NVE, the Ministry and TSOs 
ensured independence of RME. Moreover, ESA had a number of questions related to the tasks 
and authority of RME, in particular whether RME had been granted authority to carry out 
investigations into the functioning of the electricity markets, and settle disagreements on terms 
for connection to and use of the grid. At the end of the letter, ESA also questioned several 
provisions in the Norwegian legislation. Hence, it remains to be seen if ESA and the EU 
Commission would be satisfied with the justifications provided by the Norwegian government. 










In this section results from the empirical study are presented. One of the main goals of this 
research was to understand role perceptions of officials working in the Energy Regulatory 
Authority (RME). The results as presented below are based on the data from three semi-
structured interviews.   
  
4.4.1 Role Sets within RME 
It was theorized that RMEs multiple institutional embeddedness led to multiple behavioral 
logics within RME. In particular, it was argued that RME officials had to balance expectations 
of the following three roles - departmental, professional and/or supranational. Each of these 
roles contains a set of affiliated norms, values and beliefs that in the end of the day impact the 
administrative behavior / decision-making dynamics. The departmental role orientation implies 
that RME officials emphasize bureaucratic norms and values, they coordinate tasks and make 
decisions in accordance with the formalized roles, routines and rules prescribed by their 
organization. The professional role conception stresses norms and values of 
scientific/professional correctness and the power of the better argument, and implies that RME 
officials are guided primarily by these considerations rather than the pre-existing political 
interests or preferences in their decision-making. The supranational role conception emphasizes 
feelings of loyalty and allegiance to the supranational norms, interests, policies and politics. 
Decisions are expected to emphasize utilitarian benefits, collectivism, and demonstrate 
favorable attitude towards integration project as a whole. 
 
Based on the empirical data collected in this study, two role conceptions have strong subjective 
relevance for RME officials. One of these roles is the professional role. All interviewees 
stressed the importance of values of science and professionalism as modus operandi inside the 
agency. When reflecting on the agency’s role and purpose, one RME interviewee put it like 
this: 
 
‘What we work with, both on the basis of national legislation 
 but also, on the basis of EU legislation, are, to a large extent, very technical issues.  
Our task is to solve the practical questions, not the political questions’. 
 
The dedication to profession is also reflected in the manner some interviewed officials view 
their occupation/field as significant to the public good. One official puts it like this: 
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‘We work with many complex and challenging issues. Current climate policy,  
dictating that coal is to be phased out and replaced by the wind and solar energy, requires 
significant redesign of the energy system and market to ensure a stable power supply to all 
customers in the Nordic region and Europe. We have an important role to play in this  
process by developing technical regulations on how this energy system  
will look like and work in the future.’ 
 
The overall complexity of the field in which RME officials operate makes expertise of 
professional personnel into a most needed and indispensable attribute in the agency. It is 
because of their expertise RME, alike all other public agencies, is able to influence current 
policy development. Indeed, one has to have good knowledge of the field and one’s 
organization in order to carry weight in the policy discussions.   
 
The importance of norms of scientific and professional correctness is also evident in the internal 
decision-making. When asked to reflect on the main logics underlying organizational decision-
making, all interviewees expressed that the decision-making behavior within RME was strongly 
influenced by the professional concerns. Here in the words of one of the interviewees:  
 
‘Regulatory proposals that we send out for either consultation or approval  
represent mostly what we recommend and believe from a professional point of view.’ 
 
However, professional decision-making is not completely deprived of political sensitivity. All 
three interviewees emphasized that the decision-making within RME was intricate, and its final 
result could be best described as a trade-off between several conflicting interests.  
 
‘The decisions are largely based on the professional considerations,  
but then one must also weight between pure professional considerations and political 
considerations. It is rare that decisions are exclusively guided by and based on one 
consideration.  As a rule, decisions represent a trade-off  
between different considerations’. 
 
To support their argument all interviewees referenced to the recent case on the subject of grid 
rental where RMEs initial regulatory proposal had to be altered to make it more politically 
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acceptable. As a result, the regulatory proposal that was accepted by the Ministry saw rather 
differently from the one proposed by RME. 
 
The second role that occupies strong position in the hierarchy of salience among RME officials 
is the departmental role set. The departmental role implies that RME officials coordinate their 
tasks and make decisions in accordance with the formalized roles, routines and rules prescribed 
by their organization and/or unit. When asked to describe his role, one RME official succinctly 
put it like this: 
 
‘I would probably call us, including myself, bureaucrats who provide professional  
advice / assessments to the Ministry. The bureaucrat terminology describes well what most of 
us are and do. Individually, each of us is an expert in his/her own field but  
we solve issues collectively, as a department’. 
 
All interviewed RME officials also stressed the importance of the administrative rules and 
proper procedures of their organizational unit for their day-to-day operations. Within RME, 
task coordination and administrative decision-making are subject to rules and procedural 
specifications provided by the organization and by the external administrative jurisdiction. 
Rules and procedural specifications guide the behavior of RME officials in dealings with 
situations which they encounter. In particular, internal procedures specify internal case 
processing routines, and interaction and coordination patterns between RME and NVE officials. 
Interaction with the Ministry is minimized, and only relevant for the so-called ‘look into the 
future’ cases which aim primarily to foresee the development of the energy market and plan for 
the national adaptation strategy. When it comes to the individual case processing, RME acts 
independently from the Ministry.  
 
The locus of decision-making is pre-structured by the organization, making it into a very formal 
process. All proposals, assessments and/or reports prepared by individual professionals have to 
be approved by a section manager, or, which is often also a case, by all section managers in a 
management meeting. In some cases, proposals have to be approved by the director of NVE. 




Furthermore, the work of the RME professionals is subjected to the eternal administrative 
jurisdiction. The decision-making areas themselves are strictly regulated through ‘Regulation 
of grid operations and energy market’ (NEM). NEM regulates RMEs tasks and authority, and 
aims to make the division of responsibilities between RME and the Ministry as transparent as 
possible. One interviewee puts it like this:  
 
‘NEM makes it clearer who is responsible for what. Formally, we have become 
 more independent but only in very limited areas specified in the NEM. In these areas, RME 
have in general become more influential.’ 
 
Hence, the legal mandate, internal rules and procedural routines have a strong impact on the 
internal behavior dynamics within RME and serve as the major value-premise for 
administrative decision-making. 
 
As to the third, supranational role, this study did not find confirmation for that this role occupies 
strong position in the hierarchy of salience among RME officials. When reflecting on one’s role 
in connection with participation in the European networks, officials stress the importance of the 
professional expertise and access to a large professional environment. ‘Issues that are discussed 
in the committees and working groups are of complicated nature and require professional 
expertise. One can quickly get lost in the discussions if one is not technically prepared. One 
cannot keep up’. ‘It is important for us to use these arenas because here we have an opportunity 
to both influence and learn how different countries in the EU solve their problems’. 
 
The interview data also suggest that RME officials are also aware of their role as a 
representative for national interests and concerns when participating in the networks. ‘One of 
the aims for active participation in regional and European regulatory cooperation is to represent 
and safeguard Norwegian interests’. ‘We actively participate in this collaboration to ensure that 
the choices made take care of the Norwegian needs’. In 2019 RME spent large resources to 
influence the development of the European regulations of considerable consequences for 
Norway. The agency has worked extensively with the new network codes, coordinated 
implementation of a new Nordic concept for electricity balancing and led the European working 
group for balancing the power grid in Europe in ACER. Another important focus area for RME 
has been the development of new regulations on capacity allocation and congestion 
management that have been adopted in the EU. RME has worked to influence the design of 
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these regulations at EU level, and to identify the need for changes in the existing national 
regulations. 
 
Even though none of the interviewed official explicitly identified with the norms and values of 
the supranational role set, the empirical data provides some support for the claim that normative 
prescriptions of the European context become more salient for officials involved in this context. 
For instance, one interviewee stressed the positive effect of networks on infusion of the 
European considerations in the decision-making process and fostering the logic of utilitarian 
problem-solving.  
 
‘At the European level one has to regulate based on the challenges that are 
 mainly related to the rest of Europe and are not particularly a problem for us. European  
co-operation is about harmonizing regulations and that means that sometimes one has to 
harmonize at a lower level than one would do otherwise. But that’s how it works’. 
 
From this, it also follows that European networks are able to craft a degree of community 
thinking. Being part of the European expert community obliges participants to make 
compromises in the common interest of the pan-European energy sector policy. This is very 
much in line with the postulates of the theory about the transformative power of networks.  
 
Furthermore, from the theoretical point of view, the multiple embeddedness of organizational 
members can lead to role conflicts. This is because normative expectations of different roles or 
individual’s experience of these expectations can be in conflict. For instance, norms and values 
prevalent within the European cooperative arenas can contradict the existing national norms 
and values. Or norms and values of the professional communities can contradict with 
bureaucratic norms and values of the employing organization.  
 
Interviewees were asked to express the extent to which they felt the need to adjust to behavioral 
logics of different contexts. None of the interviewees expressed that they have experienced 
conflict or strain between the two highly salient role perceptions – departmental and 
professional. This can be explained by the fact that normative prescriptions of these role 
conceptions are not experienced as mutually excluding. Professionalism and bureaucracy are 
not necessarily in conflict with each other but can be complementary. The order and 
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predictability provided by bureaucracy may facilitate performance of the professional role 
(Haga et al 1974 in Stryker & Macke 1987:78). Indeed, as noted by one interviewee: 
 
‘To be considered professionally correct, all our decisions have to be anchored in the formal 
rules, routines and procedures’ 
 
The absence of role conflict or strain is also reported by officials who work in the multiple 
context. There is an overall agreement among interviewees that different ways of doing things 
in different countries undoubtedly create some challenges but these challenges predominately 
relate to the methods not the overall goal. One interviewee was convinced that the common 
goal has a positive effect on elimination of role conflict. This comes clear from the following 
statement made by one of the interviewees: 
 
‘The overall goal of the Norwegian energy policy we work under and the overall  
goal of EU energy policy we work under is the same - it is to contribute to the socially 
rational energy system. This guides our work and how we think when we solve tasks and 
approach different issues. Since the objectives of the Third Energy Market Package  
and Clean Energy Package are compatible with the Norwegian objectives,  





CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS 
In this chapter I will analyze data from the empirical research against the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter 2. In particular, it will be analyzed to what extent the role perceptions and 
administrative decision-making in the Energy Regulatory Authority (RME) can be explained 




5.1 Effect of Organizational Structure 
 
5.1.1 Horizontal Specialization  
From the organizational perspective, the role perceptions of RME officials in line with the 
departmental role set can be explained as an effect of the horizontal specialization. The 
horizontal specialization implies that the activities/tasks within NVE and RME unit itself are 
segregated according to the principle of purpose and process. The separation of the 
activities/tasks in separate departments and/or sections within professional agencies mobilizes 
attention of the organizational members to the goals and concerns of their particular task 
portfolio, and bias decision-making dynamics inwards towards the organizational unit, where 
preferences, contact patterns, roles and loyalties are directed towards sectoral portfolio and 
organizational unit.  
 
Indeed, effect of the horizontal specialization is strongly reflected in the responses of the 
interviewed RME officials. Reflecting the horizontal division of labour inside RME, the 
majority of the interviewed officials indicated that their main reference point for decision-
making was their task portfolio. This finding is not surprising if we look at the intra-
departmental specialization inside RME. Inside RME, tasks are distributed horizontally among 
five sections based on the principle of function: (1) network regulation, (2) wholesale market, 
(3) retail market, (4) economic regulation, and (5) energy market law. Each of these sections 
handles its own task portfolio. Such de-coupling of internal tasks inside RME reduces the 
amount of options available to individual decision-makers, making it possible for them to 
adequately formulate and evaluate alternatives, and achieve ‘organizationally rational outcomes 
in spite of their cognitive limitations’ (Simon 1976 in Fredrickson 1986:281). At the same time, 
it focuses attention of RME officials on the immediate concerns of their task portfolio and leads 
to more intense coordination and contact within one’s section. This is much in line with the 
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reality as it experienced and subjectively represented by the interviewees. Most of them confirm 
that they primarily collaborate at the sectional level driven to achieve their organizational goals.  
In addition to the affiliation to their section, RME officials report that they have affiliation with 
their department as a whole. The affiliation with the RME department as a whole can also be 
explained in terms of the horizontal specialization. Within the NVE organization, the separation 
of roles between RME and other NVE departments is enabled by the functional separation of 
tasks. The task of the RME department is to handle activities related to energy market 
monitoring and regulation. The segregation and concentration of regulatory tasks and officials 
in charge of these tasks in one department bias attention of RME officials to the immediate 
concerns of their task portfolio and contributes to stronger intradepartmental coordination and 
contact.  
The effect of horizontal specialization on the departmental role formation is reinforced by 
formalization of rules and working procedures. The interviews suggest that internal rules and 
procedures provided by the organizational bureaucracy guide the behavior of RME officials in 
dealings with situations which they encounter. In particular, internal procedures specify internal 
case processing routines, exchange of information routines, and interaction and coordination 
patterns between RME and NVE officials. In compliance with these procedures, tasks are 
mostly coordinated at the section- and departmental-level. Cooperation with other departments 
inside NVE shall be transparent, and is not related to the matters of individual-case processing. 
Secondly, the locus of decision-making is pre-structured by the organization, making it into a 
very formal process. All proposals, assessments and reports prepared by individual 
professionals have to be approved by the section manager, or, which is often also a case, by all 
section managers in a leadership meeting. In some cases, proposals have to be approved by the 
director of NVE. This system of checks along with the formal structure turns RME into a highly 
formalized and centralized agency. Hence, structural formalization provides a controlling effect 
on the behavior of RME officials by ensuring that their goals, attention and workflow remain 
predominately inside their department. As the majority of internal rules and procedures aim to 
circumvent contact between RME and other parts of the NVE in order not to compromise RMEs 
regulatory competencies and independence, the structural formalization inevitably reinforces 
RME official’s identification with the departmental role.  
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Furthermore, the work of the RME professional is subjected to the external or administrative 
jurisdiction. The RME is created in accordance with the Norwegian constitutional and 
administrative rules. At the same time as RME’s competencies and powers were cut off from 
the ministerial and parliamentary chain of command, they became more formalized, limited 
and more strongly anchored in the general sectoral policy framework. The decision-making 
areas and regulatory competencies themselves are strictly regulated through the ‘Regulation of 
grid operations and energy market’ (NEM). NEM regulates RMEs competencies and authority, 
and aims to make the division of responsibilities between NVE, RME and the Ministry as 
transparent as possible. Hence, both the internal and external administrative rules impact a great 
deal of internal behavior dynamics within RME and serve as the major value-premise for 
administrative decision-making. Which is also confirmed by the interviewed RME officials 
who stressed the importance of the administrative rules and proper procedures of their 
immediate organizational bureaucracy but also of the wider context of the national bureaucracy 
for their day-to-day operations.  
 
The horizontal specialization can also explain identification of RME officials with the 
professional/expert role. By dividing tasks inside RME according to the principle of process 
(function), the horizontal specialization facilitates generation of in-house expertise. The 
separation of activities/tasks inside RME reduces the number of tasks performed by an 
individual decision-maker. By focusing on their individual task portfolio, RME officials can 
adequately formulate and evaluate alternatives and become specialists in their particular area 
of expertise. Indeed, the expertise of RME officials is to a large extent linked to their field or 
task area. From the interviewees it become apparent that RME officials identify closely with 
the professional experience that they have acquired during their employment in RME. Through 
extensive on the job training in how to carry out particular tasks, they have acquired special 
skills that are of particular importance to the organizational legitimacy and survival.  
 
The professional identification of RME officials may be strengthened through the cooperation 
at the European level. Since implementation of the Third Energy Market Package, the 
cooperation between RME and the European network of energy regulators coordinated by 
ACER has become legally binding and more formalized. RME officials at the management 
level participate fully in the regulatory and the administrative board, while RME officials at the 
operational level participate in the preparatory bodies, such as working groups and committees.  
This network represents a task environment that requires horizontal coordination among expert 
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bodies for effective problem-solving. Both NRAs, TSOs, and ACER have their own roles in 
this cooperation. The cooperation goes along functional lines and is devoted to the functional 
problems of the sector. The similarity of functional problems in the energy markets experienced 
by each individual country encourages cooperation across national borders. Strong degree of 
functional interdependence among the actors creates common framework of meaning.  
 
RME officials who participate in the working groups and committees see themselves primarily 
as experts. One of their important tasks in this arena is to provide professional advice. When 
reflecting on one’s role in connection with participation in the European networks, officials 
emphasize the importance of the professional expertise and access to large professional 
environment. RME officials see networks as competence enhancing arenas where they can 
acquire new and/or validate existing knowledge in the domain of their expertise. The networks 
are also viewed as opportunity structures where RME officials use their expertise to influence 
the development of the sector and new sector regulations at the EU level. Overall, the European 
networks of experts represent an important professional reference point for officials in RME. 
Hence, exchange of information and expertise between professional groups of RME and 
professional networks reinforces the role of independent expertise and professionalism. 
 
5.2 Vertical Specialization 
Strong identification of RME officials with the professional role can also be explained as an 
effect of the inter-organizational vertical specialization at the national level. In Norway, 
structural separation of the professional agencies from their parent Ministries has been a central 
feature of the organization of the national administration since late 1800s. Already then, 
concentration of the professional administration in the agencies operating at the arm’s length 
from their parent Ministries has been a popular doctrine. Since 1990s, the doctrine of structural 
separation has been reinforced by the ideals of the New Public Management reforms. The aim 
of the structural separation has been to make the agencies more professional and politically 
neutral in the policy implementation process.    
 
The inter-organizational vertical specialization at the nation level implies that the Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Agency (NVE) is structurally separated from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (MEP). In practice, NVE have been operating at arm’s length from the 
MEP since its establishment in 1921. For the last one hundred years, NVE have managed and 
issued energy sector regulations based on the delegated authority from the Ministry. The 
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subjugation of this collegial institution to the Ministry’s management board has been an 
important prerequisite for its delegated authority. The formalized division of tasks between this 
professional agency and the Ministry as a political institution ensures clearer role distinction 
between these two institutions. Hence, the inter-organizational vertical specialization between 
the Ministry and NVE allows NVE officials to focus on their profession, acquire good 
knowledge of the field (expertise) and one’s organization. Structurally enabled de-politicization 
of the policy implementation allows NVE to cultivate the professional (expertise based) 
decision-making. The overall complexity of the energy sector and the administrative agency 
that is created to manage it, reinforces the general belief in the power of expertise and turns 
NVE professionals into a most needed specialists for the Ministry.  
 
The commitment to make the distinction between the profession and politics more palpable has 
been taken one-step further with the formalization of RME as a single regulatory authority, 
legally distinct and functionally independent from the Ministry and any other public institution. 
RME has been created as a separate and distinct entity from the Ministry and NVE. The agency 
has been assigned individual (regulatory) tasks, decision-making competences, annual budget 
allocation and personnel who cannot engage with other activities inside the NVE while holding 
a position in the RME. The ministerial authority to review, suspend or veto RME’s decisions 
has been withdrawn. All complaints on the individual decisions made by the regulatory 
authority can only be lodged to the Energy Board of Appeal. Today, RME’s independence can 
be best understood as its legal and functional independence from the Ministry in performance 
of the individual (regulatory) tasks, assigned authority and use of allocated budget funds within 
the policy framework provided by national laws, regulations and guidelines. RME’s 
competencies and powers have been more specialized, formalized, and more strongly anchored 
in the general policy framework for the sector. 
 
Reflecting the effect of inter-organizational vertical specialization, all interviewed RME 
officials see the main role and purpose of the agency to be technical/professional. RME and its 
experts are here to solve the practical/technical questions related to the functioning of the 
energy market, not the political questions. The political decisions on questions like ‘how much 
nature is to be developed for wind power or hydropower?’ or ‘how many international cables 
shall be built?’ are made outside the box in which RME operates. Once these decisions are 
made at the political level, RME ensures their sound implementation. Hence, when preparing 
reports/assessment and/or regulatory proposals RME officials are primarily guided by the 
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professional considerations. Individual decision-making where RME has a decision-making 
power is guided by ideals of transparency, neutrality, objectivity and equal treatment of the 
parties. Concomitantly, RME officials recognize that they are part of the larger political 
apparatus. Operation in this context requires good understanding of the political framework. 
The political framework is a good indicator for regulatory solutions / proposals that are viable 
from the political point of view. This indicates that RME decision-making behavior is not 
completely deprived of the political considerations.  
 
From the organizational perspective, the intra-organizational vertical specialization, which 
designates the official’s formal position within organizational hierarchy, can have implications 
for their decision-making behavior. As a rule, individuals in the managerial positions are 
exposed to greater interaction and information flows across organizational levels and units. 
Individuals in these positions are more likely to identify more strongly with the overall goals 
of the national administration and be more sensitive to signals from the political leadership than 
the officials at the operational level. Hence, they are more likely to bring a broader set of the 
considerations in the decision-making process, including the political ones. On the other hand, 
a relative degree of insulation from the political leadership and stronger embeddedness into the 
EU networks of the officials at the operational level could make these officials more sensitive 
to impulses from the EU level, hence bring more European interests in the decision-making 
process.  
 
The empirical data collected in this study demonstrates that RME officials at the operation level 
are indeed more embedded into the European networks that their immediate supervisors. Within 
RME, this separation of tasks is seen as natural and self-evident because of the nature of the 
work performed in the networks. Those who work with the professional issues are involved and 
participate in the relevant working groups, task force, working streams at the European level. 
This is done because issues discussed in these groups are professionally complicated issues that 
need similar expertise. The networks are used as a competence enhancing arenas where RME 
officials can learn how different countries in the EU solve their problems, and as an opportunity 
structures where RME officials can influence the outcomes of the important policy processes 
at the EU level. The interviewees involved in or with previous experience of working in the 
context of European networks report higher levels of exposure to the normative prescriptions 
of this context. Networking at the European level requires one to make compromises in the 
common interest of the pan-European energy sector policy. Often it means that RME officials 
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have to modify how they think about and perform regulatory work at the national level. For 
instance, the currently popular network code development at the European level aims at more 
detailed regulation of the sector actors than it traditionally was the case in Norway. These 
considerations can be a matter of technicality but still they become part and parcel of RMEs 
decision-making logic. Unfortunately, the empirical material of this research does not allow 
assessing the extent of this Europeanization effect.  
 
Furthermore, the empirical data demonstrates that there is no substantial difference in the way 
the high-ranked and low-ranked officials inside RME perceive the individual and organizational 
decision-making. All three interviewees indicated that RME’s final decisions could be better 
described as an amalgam of different considerations, a trade-off between several conflicting 
interests – professional and political. Overall, the empirical data suggests that at the individual 
level, officials rely on their technical expertise and expertise of their colleagues when making 
decisions and/or preparing proposals for change of regulations. However, as soon as these 
decisions are brought to the departmental level, they can be modified and supplemented by 
wider set of considerations. This is not surprising given the degree of formalization of the 
decision-making process inside RME. Internally, all proposals / assessments / reports prepared 
by individual professionals have to be approved by the section manager, or, which is often also 
a case, by all section managers in a management meeting. This procedure assures that interests 
of all sections within RME are represented. In some cases, regulatory proposals have to be 
approved by the director of NVE.  
 
5.3 Effect of Organizational Location  
This study also tried to assess whether RMEs location can be an explanatory factor for the role 
perceptions and decision-making behavior of RME officials. The organizational location alike 
organizational structure creates boundaries that focus the attention of individual decision-
makers and help them to cope with complex reality. The geographical or physical distance 
between the Ministry and the professional agency can have a positive effect on the autonomy, 
legitimacy and professionalism of the later.  
 
Hence, the identification of RME officials with the professional role can also be explained as 
an effect of RMEs location. The RME forms part of the state’s administrative apparatus but it 
is structurally separated from the Ministry. The RME shares offices with NVE in Oslo. When 
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deciding on RME’s location, the political-administrative leadership has chosen to keep RME 
within the professional network of NVE. The decision to not relocate RME from the main office 
of NVE in Oslo to a regional office was justified in terms of the benefit the co-location of 
professional groups could bring to efficiency and goal achievement, and the legitimacy of the 
regulator. To work and be part of the large professional environment gathered under the roof 
of NVE’s head office in Oslo has undoubtedly a strong normative and psychological effect on 
everybody who walks in and out this office, let alone officials who work in that building on a 
daily basis. Indeed, several interviewees confirmed the importance of the professional 
community in which they were part of. Task interdependencies necessitate close cooperation 
and exchange of information between RME and other departments inside NVE. This 
complementary exchange of information and expertise between professional groups of RME 
and NVE reinforces the role of independent expertise and professionalism.   
 
From the perspective of the organizational location, the co-location of RME and NVE could 
compromise impartiality of RME’s decisions. As a regulatory agency, RME shall be able to 
make their decisions based on the objective criteria and methodologies. The co-location is 
expected to encourage higher degrees of interdepartmental contact and coordination, facilitating 
extra sensitivity for the interests, preferences and signals from the main organization in the 
decision-making process. When reflecting on the decision-making inside RME in general, all 
interviewees stress its compromise-based nature where final decisions represent a trade-off 
between different interests. They also report that some decisions are still made at the level of 
NVE. Hence, there is a reason to believe that co-location of RME and NVE help to maintain 
the hierarchical link between these two institutions.  
 
The co-location of RME inside another public agency subjugated to the Ministry also attracts 
the attention from the European institutions. According to the Commission’s services, sharing 
of personnel and sharing of offices between the NRA and any other public body is, in principle, 
not in line with Article 35(4)(a) of the Electricity Directive and Article 39(4)(a) of the Gas 
Directive. From the perspective of the national political-administrative leadership, the co-
location does not seen as a problem as long as all internal and external collaboration between 
RME, NVE and the Ministry is formalized. From the interviews it follows that the RME 
officials collaborate actively with other parts of NVE on the complicated technical tasks that 
require involvement of several disciplines. This collaboration is framed by the internal 
 77 
procedures to prevent that NVE and RME encroach on each other’s competencies.  The same 
level of formalization is applicable for contact between the Ministry and RME. For cases where 
RME have been granted the decision-making authority the contact between RME and the 
Ministry is eliminated altogether. Hence, formalization of rules and processes may help to 
achieve the same effect as physical distancing of the institutions. However, one can argue that 
only the relocation of RME to a regional office could significantly reduce the currently frequent 
informal contact between RME, NVE, central authorities, politicians and supervised entities. 
Physical relocation could have made it easier to trace the trade-offs between the professional 
and political considerations, hence it could have increased the overall autotomy and legitimacy 
of RME’s decisions.  
 
From the perspective of the organizational location, the co-location of RME and NVE could 
have a controlling effect on the development of the RME’s distinctiveness, its agency-like 
identity. The separation of the professional agencies from the Ministries in physical space has 
been driven by the conviction on the part of the political-administrative leadership that such 
separation would increase the autonomy of these institutions from the political leadership. The 
same argument was used when in 2003 the political-administrative leadership started to plan 
the physical relocation of the regulatory functions from the professional agencies. Such 
relocation, it was argued, would contribute to more professionalization and legitimization of 
the regulatory function, at the same time as it would allow regulatory bodies to acquire more 
distinctive organizational profile. There is a reason to believe that co-location of RME and NVE 
slows down this process as co-location tends to encourage continuation of traditional patterns 
of behavior.  
 
The empirical data collected in this study indicates that RME officials have strong identification 
with their departmental unit. This finding can be explained in terms of the formalization of 
RME’s structure and processes. In particular, the formalization of the organizational rules and 
procedures that guide the cooperation between officials inside RME and NVE aim to 
significantly minimize formal contact and coordination between these two entities. As some 
contact and exchange of information is still inevitable due to some task interdependencies, this 
contact is strictly regulated to ensure its transparency. The interviewed officials indicated that 
they had to follow separate procedures for decision-making routines and interaction patterns 
between RME and NVE. Officials in the various units under NVE’s director cannot work in 
both RME and other departments, and RME shall itself have the competence to carry out the 
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tasks and fulfill the responsibility emanating from the Third Energy Market Package. This 
interdepartmental immobility and formalization of case processing and decision-making 
routines encourage more intradepartmental contact and coordination, and identification with 
the departmental unit. Following this line of reasoning one can say that formalization of 
organizational activities and/or communication flows play a much greater role in shaping 
organizational contact patterns than the organizational location per se.  
 
5.4 Effect of Socialization 
The last effect that was assessed in this study is the effect of socialization on role perceptions 
and administrative decision-making behavior of RME officials. In line with the theoretical 
propositions, the institutional and social contexts embedding actors have some fundamental 
implications for the behavior, identities and roles enacted by these actors. The effect of 
socialization is positively associated with the duration and the intensity of interaction/contact 
among actors, and/or exposure to certain ideational factors such as culture, norms and ideas.  
 
From the perspective of organizational socialization, RME official’s identification with the 
departmental/bureaucratic and professional role can be explained in terms of a long process of 
socialization within the national government bureaucracy. It is a result of the intensive and 
protracted exposure of RME officials to the people, norms and values of their organizational 
unit but also the wider context of national administration as a whole. As a state administrative 
body, the RME agency is situated within a larger context of the highly institutionalized 
government bureaucracy. Being a product of a long evolutionary process at the national level, 
formed by national history, culture, and social characteristics, RME subsumes national political 
and administrative cultures and beliefs.  
 
Indeed, RME is created and operates under the external administrative jurisdiction. RME’s 
competencies, duties and responsibilities are strongly anchored in the general sectoral policy 
framework with concomitant detailed regulations and guidelines specific for RME operations. 
All interviewees stress the importance of the national policy framework, regulations and 
guidelines under which they operate for the organizational decision-making. This framework 
serves as a source of political signals that RME officials utilize to frame their decisions so that 
these can be politically accepted. Hence, the national administrative jurisdiction serves as a 
strong source of practical and normative guidance for RME officials. Moreover, the interviews 
also demonstrate that the norms and values of their ‘national bureaucracy’ guide their behavior 
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during participation in the networks. They pay attention to the national concerns and needs. 
‘One of the aims for active participation in regional and European regulatory cooperation is to 
represent and safeguard Norwegian interests’. Hence, the Norwegian sector policy framework 
function as a strong normative element which prescribes bounds of behavior for RME officials.  
 
On the other hand, RME is a specialized regulatory agency with specific task and competencies. 
It is stuffed by experts responsible for efficient regulation of the electricity and gas market. 
Norms and values associated with scientific knowledge and technical expertise play an 
important role inside the agency.  The empirical data demonstrates that RME officials spend 
most of their time and energy in their organizational unit. Most obligations, expectations, and 
information networks are connected to the institution that employ them. The majority of 
interviewed officials see their colleagues as the most important and influential source of 
reference. This is not surprising, given the collegial nature of the agency. Most tasks are solved 
collectively through a lot of intradepartmental contact and cooperation. This intensive 
intradepartmental collaboration is undoubtedly an important source for production and 
reproduction of meaning and/or accepted patterns of behavior inside RME. This finds its 
resonance in the importance RME officials assign to the intradepartmental and 
interdepartmental processes and routines. Being part of the bureaucratic administration implies 
abiding by its rules, norms and values, which is experienced as natural and normal by all 
interviewees.   
 
From the perspective of organizational socialization, RME officials with regular and/or 
sustained contact with actors within European network of energy regulators would identify 
more strongly with the epistemic role conception and/or supranational role conception than 
officials without regular or sustained contact within this context. This is due to stronger 
exposure to norms and values of the network, in particular norms of professionalism, neutrality 
and independence, as well as the culture of compromise that permeates these collegial 
arrangements. When reflecting on their role in connection to participation in the European 
networks, RME officials stress the importance of the professional expertise and access to a 
large professional environment. Overall, they find participation rewarding because it provides 
access to new information and experience, as well as the possibility to influence. 
Concomitantly, they stress the positive effect of networks on the infusion of the European 
considerations in the decision-making process and fostering the logic of utilitarian problem-
solving through compromise. European networks are indeed able to create a degree of 
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community thinking between its participants. This indicates that participation in the networks 
provides RME officials with extra reference points, and exposes them to new normative 
expectations.  
 
However, based on the empirical evidence in this study there is no reason to conclude that RME 
officials with intensive interaction in the European networks are more Europeanized than their 
colleagues without such exposure. The study did not find any conclusive evidence for the 
existence of the supranational role orientation in the repertoire of roles of RME officials.  
One of the explanations for this can be that this study failed to capture RME officials with 
intensive involvements in this context to verify the socialization effect properly. The relative 
stability of the national bureaucratic role can be another explanation. As national bureaucratic 
roles represent a product of a long evolutionary process, they can be resilient to change. The 
socialization processes are slow. It takes time for the new meanings and norms to be internalized 
and exert lasting impact on the way national actors perceive themselves. The fact that RME 
officials participating in the collegial bodies are to a large extent part-timers as far as their group 
work is concerned has important implications for their role perceptions.  There are periods with 
a lot of contact and cooperation among the network actors, especially when a new network code 
is to be developed or a new legislation is to be reviewed and implemented, but also periods with 
less contact and cooperation. Under such circumstances, it is likely that the bureaucratic units 




CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
A growing number of studies indicate that increased incorporation of national regulatory 
agencies into the multi-level administrative structures of EU transforms existing patterns of 
administrative behavior in these institutions. In particular, the traditional, more local patterns 
of behavior seem to be supplemented and/or replaced by the supranational behavioral logics. 
The main purpose of this research was to assess if embeddedness of the Norwegian Energy 
Regulatory Authority (RME) in the EU network of energy regulators affects administrative 
behavior of the agency. For this purpose, role perceptions of individual officials inside RME 
were studied.  
 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that administrative behavior of RME officials are 
located on the functional expert – bureaucrat dimension. This is very much in line with the 
traditional role conception of the ‘national bureaucracy’ which epitomizes the traditional split 
between the political institution and its administration. This study did not find confirmation for 
the salience of the supranational role in the hierarchy of salience of RME officials. Being 
embedded in the European network of energy regulators, RME officials demonstrate sensitivity 
towards normative prescriptions of this context, however, they do not demonstrate complete 
allegiance to the supranational level.  
 
This study has also assessed to what extent the administrative behavior of RME officials can 
be explained in terms of the effect of the organizational structure, organizational location and 
socialization. The empirical data suggests that role perceptions and behavior of RME officials 
are systematically shaped by the organizational structure of their organizational bureaucracy. 
In particular, the horizontal specialization of the RME agency along functional lines wields the 
strongest effect on the formation of the departmental role among RME officials. Concomitantly, 
the inter-organizational vertical specialization whereby the RME is legally and structurally 
separated from the Ministry wields the strongest effect on the formation of the 
professional/expert role among RME officials.  
 
The above indicates that the traditional patterns of behavior can be quite stable and resilient to 
change as they are systematically produced and reproduced by the traditional cultures and 
institutions. The RME agency is created in accordance with constitutional and administrative 
rules of its nation state. It has been granted legal and functional independence from the Ministry 
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and NVE in performance of the individual (regulatory) tasks, assigned authority and use of 
allocated budget funds within the framework provided by laws, regulations and guidelines. The 
national sector policy framework continues to serve as a strong source of normative guidance 
for RME officials that sets the bounds of their administrative behavior.   
 
When interpreting these findings, one should keep in mind that the sample in this research is 
small and has a bias. This research draws inferences from individual observations to collective 
actors, from individual employee’s role perceptions to the administrative behavior of the 
agency. However, given the low number of respondents in this study, one should make any 
such inference with caution. The sample has also one significant drawback, it lacks RME 
officials with active involvement in the European networks. Due to such bias in the sample, the 
conclusions regarding the supranational role orientations must be taken with a bit of salt. Hence, 
the results could have been different if more officials could contribute to this study. 
 
Looking forward, it could be interesting to conduct a comparative study of the energy regulatory 
authorities across Europe. Such studies could help to illuminate if there were significant 
differences in the way different European countries had organized their energy regulators to 
meet the independence requirement of the European Union in the context of energy sector. A 
separate study of the Ministry and NVE could be desirable to assess if any adaptations (new 
competencies, roles) have been made in these institutions to adjust to the independent 
regulatory authority. However, what is probably more important is to try to conduct a new 
research of the Energy Regulatory Authority at a later stage to be able to trace its development 
over time. The organization and competencies as currently delegated to RME by the Ministry 
has already attracted scrutiny from the European level. It remains to be seen what path RME’s 
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Document Number Title Data analyzed 
FOR-2019-10-24-1413 Forskrift om nettregulering og energimarkedet 
(NEM) 





Directive 2003/54/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 
1996/92/EC 
Role, duties and 
responsibilities of NRAs 
 
Directive 2009/72/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC 
Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC 
Commission Staff Working 
Paper of 22 January 2010 
Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC 
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Markets in natural Gas 
Treaty 2012/C 326/01 Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
Consolidated version.  
Competencies of EU in the 
field of energy 
Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 
On establishing an Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy regulators 
Role, duties and 
responsibilities of ACER 
Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009 
On conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003  
Competencies of EU in the 
field of energy. detailed 
regulations for market 
design, network 




Lov om felles regler for det indre marked for 
naturgass (naturgassloven) 
 









Lov om produksjon, omforming, overføring, 
omsetning, fordeling og bruk av energi m.m. 
(energiloven) 
 





of RME in the field of 
electricity 






Prop. 5L (2017-2018) Endringer i energiloven (tredje 
energimarkedspakke) 
 
Proposed changes to the Energy Act  
Prop. 6 L (2017-2018)  Endringer i naturgassloven (tredje 
energimarkedspakke) 
 
Proposed changes to the Natural Gas Act 
Pressemelding Nr.039/17  Utredning av utflytting av tilsynsoppgavene i 
Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat  
Assessment of the relocation of the supervisory 
tasks in the Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Agency 
RME’s location  
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NA Supplerende tildelingsbrev til Norges vassdrags- 
og energidirektorat for 2020 - 
Reguleringsmyndigheten for energi  
Supplemental letter of allocation to the 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Agency for 2020 – The Energy Regulatory 
Authority 
RMEs financial 
framework, goals, and 
reporting requirements. 
EU/EØS-nytt - 4. november 
2020 – ESA letter to the 
Ministry 
ESA stiller spørsmål om uavhengigheten til 
RME 
ESA Questions RME’s Independence 
RME’s organization and 
competencies  
NVE Rapport 11/2020  Årsrapport 2019 – NVE 









Webpage - Europalov 
https://www.europalov.no 
 
Webpage - Factsheets on the European Union (Internal energy market) 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/45/internal-energy-market 
 
Webpage – Energi Fakta Norge  
https://energifaktanorge.no/en/norsk-energiforsyning/kraftnett/ 
 
Webpage - The Energy Regulatory Authority 
https://www.nve.no/reguleringsmyndigheten/ 
 
Webpage – Statnett SF 
http://2014.statnett.no/en 
 
Webpage – ENTSO-E 
https://www.entsoe.eu 
 
Webpage – ENTSO-E 
https://www.entsog.eu 
 
Webpage – EFTA 
https://www.efta.int 
 







APPENDIX 1 - INTERVJUGUIDE 
 
Intervjuguide 
Generell Informasjon  
Vennligst fortell litt om din bakgrunn (tjenestetid, arbeidserfaring) 
 
Aktivitet og kontaktmønstre  
1. Vennligst beskriv din arbeidsdag 
- arbeidsoppgaver 
- hvor mye av arbeidsdagen går ut på samhandling med NVE / ACER / Europeisk 
Transnasjonal Energi nettverk? (inkludert møter, epost, telefonsamtaler)  
- frekvens på fysiske møter med NVE/ACER/andre aktører i energi 
reguleringsnettverket?  
- hvilke hensyn vektlegges når skjønn utøves i ditt daglige arbeid? 
(hensynet til egen avdeling, faglige / profesjonelle hensyn, departementet, EU-byrå 
innenfor eget saksområde) 
 
 
2. I hvilken grad koordineres arbeidet med ulike organer (NVE, departementet, det 
transnasjonale nettverk, ACER)? 
 
3. Hvilke institusjoner (NVE, departementet, transnasjonale nettverk, ACER) oppfatter 
du som mest innflytelsesrike med hensyn til ditt/regulator arbeid?  
 
4. Fører deltagelse i nettverket til utvikling av felles oppfatninger av hvilke løsninger 
som er gode/dårlige? 
 
5. Fører deltagelse i nettverket til utvikling av tillitsrelasjoner? 
 
6. Hva ser du som organisasjonens hovedoppgaver og målsettinger?  
 
Rolleoppfatninger 
1. Hvordan vil du beskrive din rolle? 
 
2. I hvilken grad føler du at du må tilpasse deg til forskjellige atferds logikker i 
forskjellige fora (NVE, departementet, ACER, transnasjonale nettverk)? 
 
3. Vil du si at forskjellige fora (NVE, departementet, ACER, det transnasjonale nettverk) 













Figure 2: The Process of Adoption of Guidelines and Network Codes in the EU 
 
 
Figure 3: Network Codes initiated following a request addressed to ENTSO by the EC 
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Figure 4: ACER Organization  
 
 
 
